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Products or Outputs?: Probing the Implications of Changing the Outputs of Intelligence

Following Trends and Triggers: Estimating State Instability

Reviews:

The Glomar Explorer in Film and Print

No More Secrets: Open Source Information and the Reshaping of U.S. Intelligence

***KLO ui Hangukchon Pisa* [Secret History of the KLO in the Korean War]**

Bloodmoney

Intelligence Officer's Bookshelf

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Probing the Implications of Changing the Outputs of Intelligence

A Report of the 2011 Analyst-IC Associate Teams Program

> ***"Intelligence, especially intelligence analysis, cannot truly be transformed until its practitioners have reshaped the way they think of their products."***

This article is a result of the 2011 Analyst-IC Associate Teams Program sponsored by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research. The IC members of the group, all experienced intelligence officers, teamed with Greg Treverton, a former vice chairman of the National Intelligence Council, to examine how intelligence is delivered to Intelligence Community consumers. The study's bottom line is that intelligence, especially intelligence analysis, cannot truly be transformed until its practitioners have reshaped the way they think of their products. This, the research team believes, must be done if IC analysis is to effectively serve future generations of policymakers.

For all the experimentation with technology and intelligence production over the years, intelligence products have remained remarkably unchanged: they are primarily static, branded, and stovepiped. They are words on a page or pixels on a computer monitor produced within agency stovepipes that give pride of place to the subject matter expertise resident in those stovepipes. Early in our deliberations, we realized that the language of "products" was itself confining because it tended to channel thinking of intelligence producers into familiar grooves—viewing the outcome of analysis as a static commodity. Thus, we started to use the word "outputs" to open up our thinking about what it is that the Intelligence Community (IC) "produces" and how it interacts with policy officials and decisionmakers in sharing the fruits of its work.

In principle, social media—especially Wikis but perhaps also Facebook and others—provide openings for rethinking outputs. Wikis seem tailor-made for intelligence. As evolving, living documents that are changed as new evidence surfaces and new ideas arise, Wiki pages let experts in different subject areas come together and permit interested nonexperts to challenge views. And throughout, Wikis maintain easily followed, rich metadata about where evidence comes from and who altered the content.

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the authors. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.

If the IC is to realize the potential gains offered by such nontraditional intelligence outputs, it must reconsider many of the traditional ways it conducts business.

If the IC is to realize the potential gains offered by such nontraditional intelligence outputs, it must reconsider many of the traditional ways it conducts business.

Outputs, Not Products

Consider the following scenario. Forward-deployed US commanders are devising possible military responses to the recent a?gressive actions of *Country X*. During the meeting, one senior commander, using his secure iPad, texts a question to his intelligence analyst at another location. Meanwhile, in the classified blogosphere of Intelink, analysts from across the IC, including some of the top minds on the subject, have been debating *Country X*'s next move. The intelligence analyst finds the thread, summarizes key points, and texts back to the commander. At the same time, the analyst injects concerns his commander has raised into the blog conversation, and the other IC participants begin to voice their opinions. The analyst reports the outcomes to his commander, who can immediately incorporate them into operational planning.

Such a vision of intelligence analysis is quite different from the IC's current model. Provision of secure iPads or similar technology is probably not terribly difficult; the real challenge to adopting this model will be cultural. The norms of the intelligence business are reflected in the lexicon it uses. Intelligence analysis results in "products." Today, delivery of every "product" connotes the end of an analytic process, the completion of a "finished intelligence" report and its delivery to a customer. These reports are bounded, discrete, and static packages of data.

Provision of intelligence support, of course, is more complex, continuous, and nuanced than delivery of a single product. As an example, analysts forward-deployed to a customer's office sometimes provide annotated reports to the customer. These typically include raw, unevaluated intelligence reports the analyst thinks may pique the customer's interest. The analyst prints out the reports, highlights key passages, and adds notes on the report's impact on earlier analysis of the subject. This type of support was highlighted by former National Security Council Director for Afghanistan Paul Miller (a CIA officer on assignment to the NSC), who suggested that "senior analysts and managers should be allowed to e-mail quick replies and analyses directly to their policy counterparts [in the way that I could]. This approach may not be appropriate for every account, but in crisis policymaking, it is indispensable."[1]

In our hypothetical example, the analyst chatting to his commander on an iPad was providing intelligence support—the "output" of his expertise—but he was not producing a finished analytical product. In cases such as these, the term "intelligence outputs" more accurately captures the assortment of ways in which intelligence information and expertise are delivered, and suggests more precisely the benefits and utility the IC generates. Outputs could include telephone calls, conversations, or writing for other analysts, acts seldom counted in the current performance appraisal system. "Non-stat-worthy," these outputs are nevertheless often highly beneficial to customers. Similar non-stat-worthy activities for policymakers, such as contributions of tacit knowledge into an IC-wide repository, or the capturing of how judgments were reached in an assessment are generally considered less valuable or not valued at all in personnel evaluation systems.

At the same time, traditional intelligence products—the President's Daily Briefing (PDB) reports, the current intelligence production, the longer assessments, all of which are counted with great care in personnel evaluations—may not be well connected to customer needs. Panels studying the IC over the years have repeatedly

warned of gaps between IC support and end user needs.[2] One reason for this disconnect is that traditional finished analytic products are often not written with particular customers in mind. These kinds of observations help to paint a picture of the IC that "resembles a production process in a Soviet-style planned economy, where higher-order management determines production quotas for what *ought* to be manufactured, without regard to whether the end-users really want or need what is coming out of the production cycle."[3]

Broader Customer Base Requires Broader Concept of Support

Former Deputy Director of National Intelligence (ADNI) for Analysis Thomas Fingar has noted that the concept of "national security" has broadened over the years, and especially so after 9/11. Where once the term was confined to military, diplomatic, and political/ideological threats, it now includes the geopolitics of energy, global financial flows, the spread of infectious disease, and the safety of individual American citizens anywhere on the globe. This expanded definition has in turn also increased the number and variety of institutions and individuals desiring or demanding analytic support from the IC.[4]

Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 208 ("Write for Maximum Utility") urges analysts to give customers information in a form they can easily use and share. However, it is becoming increasingly difficult for traditional finished intelligence products to meet the demands of today's more diverse group of customers. A finely polished piece without a well-understood audience is likely to fail to fully meet the needs of any reader. A product that attempts to appeal to a wide audience risks coming across as a lowest-common-denominator product, vanilla and generic, and lacking specifics decisionmakers need. And a product written specifically for one individual but delivered to a wide audience will come across as irrelevant to many. How, then, can the IC meet the challenge of serving a diverse audience?

It is becoming increasingly difficult for traditional finished intelligence products to meet the demands of today's more diverse group of customers.

First, we think the IC must abandon the idea of a "final product" and end its reliance on a limited number of "finished intelligence" publications. In their place it should adopt flexible and varied forms of delivering support, sufficient to meet the differing objectives of America's multiple national security missions. By pursuing a comprehensive range of outputs, the IC will be moving away from a product-centered model and toward a service–centric model like the one recently proposed in this publication by two senior IC analysts.[5]

In many ways, these opposing models have been competing for some time in the IC. Former CIA Associate Deputy Director for Intelligence Martin Petersen described it in an article in this journal in 2011.

> *A service mentality is the opposite of a product mentality, which often seems to drive the work of intelligence analysis… In a product mentality, the focus is on the producer, who thinks of a product as his or hers. It is also about packaging that product and disseminating it widely. Success is measured in numbers—how many units were produced or how many received each unit. It is about filling a book or producing a product to demonstrate that an analyst is ready for the next big step in a career.*[6]

Focus on Products Leads Us to Neglect Other Important IC Functions

Over the past 60 years or so, the IC has developed and refined a process to support the construction of products. We argue that many of the IC's norms are defined by the processes that create them. The need to create today's products touches almost every facet of the IC. They affect hiring, orga-

Current IC Focus	Future IC Goals
Products	Outputs
Statistics & performance driven	Consumer needs-driven
Stove-piped production process	Analyst exchange during research/production process (including outside the IC)
Static products	Dynamic and static outputs
Discrete	Share while protecting sources and methods
Inconsistent feedback/lacking effective feedback mechanisms	Effective and utilized feedback mechanisms
No defined audience	Clearly defined audience
Set scopes/purposes determined by producing agency	Evolving and shifting scopes to meet consumer requirements
Analyst as producer to policymaker/decision maker	Value-added producer to consumers who need the intelligence
Product disseminated and complete	Dialogue between producer and consumer before and during production
Finished intelligence	Useful information and analysis to consumer
Traditional dissemination mechanisms	Traditional and non-traditional dissemination (including analyst as output via social media, etc)

nization, training, and performance measurement (individually and organizationally). Some have cynically said that intelligence analysts don't write for customers; they write for their human resources (HR) systems. As the saying goes, "a system is perfectly designed to deliver the results it is receiving." In the case of the IC, the HR system rewards only official, "stat-worthy" products, which means that other important IC responsibilities have sometimes been neglected. Two such neglected areas include the coverage of non-Tier-1 issues[a]—in other words, matters falling outside the US government's top priorities—and the documentation of analytical tradecraft.

The Tier Structure

In the first instance, because current intelligence publications such as the PDB emphasize the highest priority, generally shorter-term topics of importance to national-level decisionmakers—the Tier-1 issues, such as potential conflicts and nuclear or terrorist threats—the production formula of delivering products that provide definitive "so-whats" together with clear implications for action works.

That formula does not work as well with lower-priority, non-Tier-1 issues unless they become crises. These areas usually have fewer analytic, collection, and policymaking resources devoted to them. In many cases, analysts do their own collection—for example, finding and translating documents.[b] In addition, because analysts who follow lower priority issues have more limited communities of interest in the policy and intelligence communities, they receive fewer requests for information. Under these circumstances, analysts called on to address a matter that suddenly becomes important to the president and other high level officials are especially challenged. They will have less information to work with and will be expected to provide more context to policymakers unfamiliar with the issues, personalities, and key factors at play.

Non-Tier-1 issues may lurk below the headlines, but they can rise up to bite both intelligence analysts and policymakers, as we saw at the outset of the Arab Spring in late 2010. Tunisia, for example, was not a Tier-1 country at the time. A system that recognizes and rewards work and outputs that enable longer-term analysis, even in seemingly less important areas, might improve the IC's ability to understand and

[a] Tiers are defined and their components listed in the IC's annually reviewed National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF). The NIPF was introduced after the fall of the Soviet Union, when allocating resources became a more complex matter than it had been during the two-superpower world.

[b] Though not directly related to the tier structure, changes in the open source business model have led the DNI's Open Source Center to focus less on traditional tasks like translating articles and more on its own analytical production and on assessing other media (e.g., the World Wide Web and social networks).

quickly respond to events that suddenly magnify the importance of lower-tier issues.

The product-centered environment has also discouraged the use of new technologies and opportunities for electronic collaboration.

Documenting Analytic Tradecraft

Analysts excel at providing clear, succinct assessments, but they traditionally resist providing details of how they come to their judgments.[7] This occurs in part because the current product-oriented system does not reward the effort sufficiently.

Details of tradecraft may provide more information than most policymakers want, but without those details, readers will find it difficult to discern the rigor of the analysis or to reconstruct the thinking behind the conclusions. A disciplined approach to preserving records of analytical processes would help other analysts learn from the experience and apply methods used in one problem to another. Alternatively, with the passage of time, the previously used methodology could be applied to new data to come up with updated findings. New analysts could work to improve upon past methods instead of creating their own. The value of turning what might become stagnant methodology into progressive methodology built on the work of others cannot be overstated.

As things stand, the disincentives to creating such documentation outweigh the potential benefits, however great they may be to the IC as a whole. The time required is substantial, few policymakers ask for it, and there is the risk that in doing so, analysts and their managers will expose themselves to criticism, especially from those who might support alternative points of view.

This situation was partially addressed in ICD 203 ("Analytic Tradecraft") and ICD 206 ("Source Requirements for Disseminated Analytic Products"). These two directives required, for the first time, analysts to "show their work."[8] In addition, as a result of ICD 203, intelligence agencies have established product evaluation boards to determine how well their products are conforming to ODNI analytic standards.[a] In spite of such beneficial changes, there are still strong individual motivations to document as little of one's tradecraft as possible.

Adoption of Collaborative Technologies

A product-centered environment also discourages the use of new technologies and opportunities for electronic collaboration. For example, we found only one organization that came close to using Wikis to produce main-line products. The organization is a small group that works solely with openly available information. It does so in part because it is a relatively new entity, unencumbered by long-running past practices. Even so, it uses Wikis more for warehousing knowledge than for producing material for external audiences.

What Would Tools for a New Output-Focused Paradigm Look Like?

In a widely read blog post some time ago, Clay Shirky, a prominent thinker on the social and economic effects of Internet technologies, examined the challenges facing the newspaper industry in the digital age.

> *If the old model is broken, what will work in its place? The answer is: Nothing will work, but everything might. Now is the time for experiments, lots and lots of experiments, each of which will seem as minor at launch as craigslist did, as Wikipedia did, as octavo volumes did.*[9]

While the IC faces declining budgets, it should not stop try-

[a] CIA's Directorate of Intelligence has had such an evaluation component since the mid-1980s.

Like it or not, analysts would be forced to "show their work" in a Wiki environment.

ing to innovate in support of customers. So, befitting Shirky's challenge, below we offer six experiments that might lead to changed processes and outputs. Three focus on process, three on output.

I. Using Wikis to Draft Finished Intelligence

While Wikis have been available to the IC for more than five years, their adoption has been a wholly grassroots movement among advocates who believe Wikis have the potential to better capture knowledge and to promote increased transparency. However, this grassroots effort has been unable to effect change in the processes used to support the production of finished intelligence.

In all but a few cases, the current work process consists of creating Microsoft Word documents, sending them via e-mail, and receiving coordination and review comments in "track changes" on electronic files, or in writing on hardcopy printouts, and incorporating those comments into a final product. With the exception of the use of IC-wide computer connectivity—thanks to the introduction of the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS) and ICE-mail—this process would be recognizable by any analyst who left the IC in the mid-1980s. While comfortable to many, the process is subject to losses—coordination and review comments between analysts and managers are not always well preserved in e-mail or hardcopy. How an agency came to its conclusions in any product is opaque to those who stand outside the process. One of those individuals, former Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg, lamented that he wasn't privy to these exchanges.[10] We can imagine many other policymakers might share that sentiment.

While many in the IC would abhor the thought of showing customers "how the sausage is made," such give-and-take could easily be captured using Wikis, which capture rich metadata, including the identities of those revising content and the nature of the changes they made. Like it or not, analysts would be forced to "show their work" in a Wiki environment.

In 2006, when Intellipedia was in its infancy, ADNI for Analysis Fingar proposed using Intellipedia to create a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Nigeria. The effort failed for many reasons, not all of them related to technology. The project was probably too big and tried too soon. Many in the IC were uncomfortable with the new technology and immediately looked to undermine the effort. Despite such false starts, however, there are good reasons for pursuing these alternative forms of analysis. Now that Intellipedia has been around for more than five years, it would behoove the IC to try again, perhaps not with an NIE but with less ambitious objectives, in order to gain experience and to collect some successes upon which to build.

II. Adopting the Living Intelligence System

A much more ambitious project than Wiki-based analysis is currently under development within the IC, primarily within the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA). The Living Intelligence System (LIS) aims to transform the stovepiped, agency-proprietary reporting and analysis process and to reduce the amount of static and duplicative analytic production. Rather than using Wikis simply to draft existing product lines, the LIS suggests that "tailored snapshots should be the exception not the rule and 'products' should be the by-product of the collaborative process, not the end state."[11] The LIS would move the review process into the same place in which transparent, online collaboration takes place. Contributors, *including official reviewers*, would be held accountable, and they and their agencies would still receive credit for their work even in the absence of a traditional "finished" product. The system would show how points of view emerged—or were prevented from emerging—and who was responsible.

To date, there are only a few units in NGA that have been willing to test the LIS. Participation by other IC agencies would help determine the viability of the platform and potentially chart a new way forward for the community. Adoption of the concept in the IC would be an uphill battle, however, because many agencies are reluctant to give up their existing business models. Agencies often claim they are responding to the needs of customers who demand tailored output and would view other outputs as unwarranted and wasteful. Indeed, most customers interviewed for this study did want intelligence output tailored to their needs, but that does not mean that LIS could not be used to support such demands.

For LIS to succeed, it will need strong executive leadership willing to break the stranglehold that individual agencies have on existing production processes. Although some senior executives admit that they are embarrassed by redundant and duplicative production, they have done little to change the status quo.[12]

Even if it has executive buy-in, LIS would need to win over skeptical middle managers, who view it as a way to hold them accountable when something they approved or inserted turns out to be incorrect. The opaqueness of the existing production model lets them easily avoid accountability by permitting errors to be waved off as a systemic failure.

As our world becomes more complex, useful expertise will increasingly be located outside of the IC.

III. Fixing Outreach

As our world becomes more complex, useful expertise will increasingly be located outside of the IC. For instance, in a study of the analysis surrounding Arab Spring, the Stimson Center noted "NGOs in particular enjoy a distinct advantage in understanding societal intentions and capacities, and their more limited interaction with government officials may provide them more insight into societal trends."[13]

Despite ODNI efforts to expand outreach to experts outside the IC, RAND research in support of this article revealed that significant hurdles remain. ICD 205 ("Analytic Outreach") and numerous pronouncements by senior ODNI leaders on the importance of analysts engaging with the outside world have not overcome the sense that the task is simply too hard—money is required, outside contacts have to be vetted, discussion topics must be approved, and so on. In his *Studies in Intelligence* article cited earlier, Martin Petersen remarked, "Many of the people we serve believe they are better plugged into the world than we are. And in many cases, they are."[14]

This echoes the sentiment of former Acting Director of the CIA John McLaughlin, who has said that some customers believe they have a "more comprehensive and sophisticated understanding of the issues than intelligence specialists," a view, he added, that was often justified.[15] During a visit to CIA headquarters, former Deputy Secretary of State Steinberg lamented how analysts "don't get out enough and get their hands dirty" because of security concerns.[16] He suggested that this affects the IC's ability to serve its customers.

Dennis Wilder, a senior CIA Directorate of Intelligence officer, won a Galileo Award in 2011 for a paper entitled "An Educated Consumer Is Our Best Customer."[17] During the award ceremony, Wilder, who was then a senior PDB reviewer, took the opportunity to discuss intelligence support to policymakers. He stopped short of calling IC products "irrelevant," but it was clear from his remarks that he believed the IC was falling short of providing its customers with the insight they needed. Taking note of a book cowritten by former CIA analyst Jerrold Post on the health of world leaders, *When Illness Strikes the Leader*,[18] Wilder reported that the book and another unclassified work by a CIA doctor did a far better job of informing policymakers on the subject than any he had seen from the IC. Yet, how

Analysts probably need fewer policies and less education about outreach, and more assistance in navigating the overbearing but necessary security hurdles to accomplish it.

many analysts have written unclassified products since they have become part of the IC?

This is not an isolated case. Former NSC Director for Afghanistan Paul Miller, mentioned earlier, told this research team that security restrictions on outreach are "isolating analysts and making contact with other experts in their fields difficult, awkward, and sporadic."[19] Ken Lieberthal, in a 2009 monograph published by the Brookings Institution, reported that "Security concerns have also sharply reduced the ability of most IC analysts to benefit from interaction with the non-IC academic, think tank, NGO, and business communities."[20]

These reports by senior leaders and senior customers are disturbing. Moreover, when this team reported its findings to an ODNI conference in July 2011, attendees lauded ICD 205 as a monumental accomplishment, from its initial drafting to its signing. Yet it is likely that a large percentage of IC analysts have never heard of it. They are more intimately familiar with the checklist—sometimes 20 steps long—that greets them when they apply to attend an outside conference or meet with an outside expert. Analysts probably need fewer policies and less education about outreach, and more assistance in navigating the overbearing but necessary security hurdles to accomplish it. It may be more effective for the IC to channel resources into an outreach "center of excellence" staffed with knowledgeable security and counterintelligence personnel to assist analysts in this endeavor.

IV. Delivering Tablets

Nascent efforts to use iPads and other tablets to support customers do exist and are to be commended. However, effective use of this technology requires processes, people, and outputs that are wholly different from those we have today.

Because tablets offer so many new ways in which customers can engage with content, utilizing tablets will dramatically affect IC work practices. Customers receiving intelligence support through a tablet are almost certain to expect an experience fundamentally different from reading a traditional product. Those experienced in using tablets will want layered products that allow them to drill down deeply into subjects. If they are reading about a world leader, for example, they will expect links to the person's closest associates, travel schedule, and videos of recent speeches. Yet the IC efforts we have observed still resemble the paper model, making tablets essentially "electronic paper." Today's digital IC products may allow a customer to drill down only one level, perhaps to an original source or a related leadership profile. The model for preparing a package to meet tablet-based consumers' increased expectations is categorically different from the IC's existing model, and changing it will require considerable effort.

During our ODNI presentation, one attendee mentioned that he was an early adopter of tablet technology but that he had abandoned the *New York Times* iPad app to return to the paper copy. Indeed, the relationship between people and new technology is a fragile one, and if users are to adapt to and accept changes in output, that new technology had better deliver a new and impressive experience. Examples of how tablets can facilitate the delivery of insight can be found in the "Our Choice" app or IDEO's "Future of the Book."[21]

V. Delivering Outputs via Electronic/Social Media

Expansion of electronic connectivity between the IC and its customers should continue. As noted in a 2005 *Studies in Intelligence* article,

> *The Intelligence Community has made substantial, although sporadic, efforts over the past decade and a half to explore better and more technologically advanced*

> *methods of communicating with consumers. The results, however, have been modest at best. The requirement to have background and contextual information available at the policymaker's fingertips in a timely fashion remains unfulfilled.*[22]

Paul Miller took away a similar lesson from his experience on the NSC.

> *The IC dissemination system resembles a stack of sliced Swiss cheese in which the slices haphazardly cover up the holes in the cheese. The IC has many dissemination systems, all of which have gaping holes.*[23]

The most difficult aspect of supporting customers electronically may be the customers themselves, who have different delivery preferences. Steinberg indicated that he would have preferred "more electronic and real time engagement" with the IC, yet Miller reports that "most policymakers will not take the trouble to sign up for an account, install a web certificate, or regularly go to a website to look for new products." His most effective dissemination system was e-mail.[24] With such wide-ranging preferences before it, the IC cannot appear flat footed in supporting its customers. In short, the IC cannot afford to be unprepared when "digital natives" take over its customer base.

A relatively low-cost experiment would be the introduction of recommendation engines, like those used by Amazon.com, into IC websites.

Most of the IC's electronic engagement with customers has been on classified networks. The hassle of accessing these networks has limited the frequency and ease of engagement. As an alternative, the IC may want to explore setting up private Twitter feeds to which customers can subscribe. Private Twitter feeds allow producers to approve who receives updates. The rules for IC use of Twitter would have to be established and made clear, but the medium would provide the ability to engage customers at any time of the customer's choosing. Updates might include notifications about new assessments, links to unclassified outputs, or immediate notification regarding new, unclassified developments.

VI. Using Recommendation Engines as Briefers

A relatively low-cost experiment would be the introduction of recommendation engines, like those used by Amazon.com, into IC websites used by customers. In today's publication environment, IC briefers perform the function of recommendation engines but cannot serve the large number of customers who would like to have a briefer. Technology can lend a hand.

On today's IC websites, a consumer interested in China will be greeted by the same content as a visitor interested in terrorism. In contrast, Amazon.com, iTunes, Netflix, and other retailers have long greeted each customer based on that individual's interests. Just as briefers tailor briefing books for their customers, a recommendation engine could direct customers to IC products or websites of potential interest. This same technology could also benefit IC officers themselves.

Our suggestion of this approach should not be viewed as an attempt to replace briefers and the conversation they facilitate between the IC and its customers. The recommendation engine would primarily support customers without dedicated briefers.

The Challenges of a New Paradigm

New processes will no doubt raise new problems. For example, who would be allowed to contribute to Wikis and blogs? How should sensitive matters, especially compartmented material, be handled? What arrangements can be made to involve consumers, who in their activities often acquire information that analysts would want to have? How would this new system overcome traditional policymaker reluctance to share certain kinds of information with the IC? If policymakers

A shift to a more effective production paradigm will not take place as long as systems continue to reward production of the obsolete at the expense of new forms of information delivery.

are given access, how would an interactive system address the possibility that policymakers might gain undue influence over analysis? How would major analytic differences be adjudicated?

There also are questions regarding the evaluation of outputs under the paradigm we describe. Would product evaluation boards and ICDs on standards still be required? Would analysts maintain high tradecraft standards in Wiki and blog environments? How will managers measure output and encourage and maintain good tradecraft?

Despite so many unanswered questions, we believe this paradigm shift would offer benefits that outweigh the risks. Indeed, in some ways, the shift may be unstoppable. The explosion of social media and whatever its future might bring seems likely to become more and more important to political leaders as they reach out to their key constituencies, gauge public opinion, and try to get quickly ahead of crises. In that kind of environment, static, finished intelligence reports dealing mainly with top-tier issues will fail to meet the needs of the IC's consumers, from the top to working levels. A shift to a more effective production paradigm will not take place as long as systems continue to reward production of the obsolete at the expense of new forms of information delivery.

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Endnotes

Unless otherwise noted, all notes are unclassified.

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Estimating State Instability

J. Eli Margolis

"Estimating state instability is more than warning. It is a structured analysis of instability types, their likelihood and potential impact on US national interests, and their most likely and most dangerous manifestations."

The events of the "Arab Spring" that swept the Middle East in early 2011 focused policymakers' attention on the problem of state instability. As they struggled to catch up to events, more than one lamented the lack of intelligence warning. The president reportedly said he was "disappointed with the Intelligence Community." (A White House spokesman later denied this was the case.)[1] The chairwoman of the Senate Select Committee for Intelligence added that "these events should not have come upon us with the surprise that they did…there should have been much more warning."[2] The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff reflected that events had "taken not just us but many people by surprise."[3]

While right to demand warning, these leaders were wrong to limit the scope of intelligence to warning. Estimative intelligence that was focused on the prospects and likely shape of instability in the region would have helped policymakers develop plans and strategies to respond.

Estimating state instability is more than warning. It is a structured analysis of instability types, their likelihood and potential impact on US national interests, and their most likely and most dangerous manifestations. This kind of analysis goes beyond determining probabilities. It also structures scenarios and evaluates the potential impact of events.

In this article, I introduce a structured, qualitative method for estimating state instability. The first section reviews and critiques existing approaches, identifying their strengths and weaknesses. The second section presents a method for addressing these weaknesses and introduces four analytic tools.

Approaches to State Instability

Government, business, academic, and nonprofit organizations assess state instability with analytic approaches as varied as their goals.[4] These methods, which generally either use quantitative or qualitative approaches, can be both innovative and problematic.[5]

Quantitative

A wide range of predictive and current quantitative models of state instability exist. Notable

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predictive models include three developed under government sponsorship: Fuzzy Analysis of Statistical Evidence (FASE—US Army), Integrated Crisis Early Warning System (ICEWS—US Army) and the Political Instability Task Force (PITF—CIA).[6] Models that evaluate current conditions—or indices—are more common. These have ties to government, (Country Indicators for Foreign Policy [CIFP], Canada), business (Political Instability Index, Global Political Risk Index), academia (Index of State Weakness, State Fragility Index), and non-profits (Failed States Index [FSI]).[7]

Several strengths of these approaches enable intelligence support to policymaking. First, some of them are effective. With successful prediction rates of around 80 percent, the three predictive models cited above have enormous potential as sources of warning.[8] Proven success provides credibility and wins the trust of leaders.[9]

Second, these models are comparative and permit leaders and staff members to survey the world quickly for warning signs and to benchmark countries against others, in the region or in the news. Clear plots over time provide for longitudinal comparison and intuitive pattern recognition. And the tables and maps of CIFP, ISW, or FSI, for example, make comparisons visually appealing, informing policy discussions without bogging them down in methodology.

Last, numbers allow precision. Policymakers and their staffs feed on details. The identification of a 10-percent decline is more helpful than a judgment of "decreasing" stability; a 60-percent risk is more concrete than "likely." The precision of these models has the potential to raise the impact and effectiveness of intelligence.

Unfortunately, the quantitative models' weaknesses inhibit their use as intelligence tools to support policymaking. First, these models are limited to warning. The best among them predict instability; the rest measure vulnerability. Neither of these helps leaders think through the shape, scale, or pace of the threat presented by a potential instability crisis. These models are all probability and no impact.

Second, they can be misleading. Policymakers paying attention to the recent history of popular current stability indices, for example, could not have anticipated that instability would sweep across the Middle East. As the table on the facing page shows, four current indices buried countries like Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Syria beneath at least 30—but sometimes as many as 100—others in rankings from 2007 through 2010.

Third, too few pass the "warm Pepsi test:" the imperative to provide information that cannot be gained from a sharp undergraduate in exchange for a warm Pepsi. The top 10 countries to worry about are no surprise to leaders, who do not need complex models to recognize the fragility of Somalia, Iraq, or Burma.[10]

Last, they are generic, privileging uniform scholarship over a tailored case-specific relevance. The models approach different types of states in the same way. Policymakers are asked to accept work that grades Ireland and Iran using the same score sheet. Moreover, none of the models consider the importance of unstable states to the national interest of the United States or its allies.

Overall, these weaknesses keep quantitative models of state instability out of most important decisions. Where they are effective and included, their impact is limited to warning. To date, quantitative approaches have helped to sound alarms, but not to develop policies, plans, or strategies to address potential crises.[11]

Instability Rankings of "Arab Spring" Countries, 2007–2010

	Tunisia	Egypt	Libya	Syria
Failed States Index	122, 122, 121, 118*	36, 40, 43, 49	115, 111, 112, 111	40, 35, 39, 48
State Fragility Index	97, 89, 100, --	53, 50, 48, --	82, 75, 100, --	72, 75, 75, --
Economist Intelligence Unit	67, --, 134, --	75, --, 106, --	133, --, 137, --	65, --, 94, --
Index of State Weakness	--, 112, --, --	--, 78, --, --	--, 86, --, --	--, 59, --, --

*Rankings listed by year: 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, respectively. Each ranking number indicates that there were n countries at greater risk of instability or failure than the listed country that year.

Qualitative

Although several structured qualitative approaches to estimating state instability exist, explicitly predictive frameworks are rare. Outside of government, analogy-based and Delphi forecasts are relatively common.[12] Most measure the vulnerability of systems (trends), and some assess events that might overwhelm particular systems (triggers). Within government, these include Indicators (CIA), Strategic Conflict Assessment (UK), and the Stability Assessment Framework (Netherlands).[13]

The strengths of this group have earned its products an ear with policymakers. First, the approaches are intuitive in ways that complicated models are not. It is easier to connect a forecast of stability with trends than with a statistical measure like infant mortality rate, for example. It is also harder to believe a quantitative warning of instability that does not consider case-specific dynamics like grievances or actors. This intuitive advantage of the qualitative models enables leaders to use such products more effectively in interagency or public debate. Policymakers need to be able to do more than cite abstract stability scores.

Second, the qualitative models are adaptable. A trends-and-triggers approach is like Velcro; it sticks to everything from provinces to states to regions. It can be made to fit different regime types, economic models, and ideologies. This ability to integrate the unique traits of its subject raises this method's credibility with policymakers. Further, case-specific details can teach leaders as well as warn them. A Strategic Conflict Assessment of Venezuela, for example, will leave its reader knowing more about the country than a glance at the country's PITF or FSI rating.

Finally, qualitative approaches play to the strengths of most intelligence agencies, which are long on country experts, but short on statisticians. They also reduce the practical challenge agencies face in quality control. Adherence to structured qualitative approaches requires only discipline because analysts already have the required skills. In contrast, adopting quantitative models may impose significant new training demands.

This group also has weaknesses, however. First, these methods still do not move far beyond probability. Trends and triggers can be combined to estimate the likelihood of instability and perhaps the shape of its onset. After that, the lights go dark. The general estimative judgments needed for planning—scenario types, scale, and course; regional responses; and consequences—tend to be absent. A generic warning of instability in Libya, for example, would not have helped Western governments prepare policy options for its breakdown in early 2011. Libya's path would have remained a mystery: Would the crisis move toward repression, coup, civil war, or something else?

Second, this weakness is compounded by a tendency to encourage analysis focused more on the past than on the future. These approaches outline sophisticated ways to plot past trends and to identify potential future triggers, but they do not provide a logic to guide the combination of the two into a forward-looking judgment of probability. Their force fades quickly as judgments move into the future.

In the end, however, the balance of benefit between quantitative and qualitative approaches hinges on the abil-

The balance of benefit between quantitative and qualitative approaches hinges on the ability of each to produce estimative judgments.… [Of the two,] *structured qualitative approaches show more promise.*

ity of each to produce estimative judgments. Here, despite their strengths, sophisticated quantitative models do not carry much weight; most remain limited to warning. Instead, structured qualitative approaches show more promise, although it remains a promise yet to be fully realized.

Estimating State Instability

This section introduces a method that resolves the weaknesses of current structured qualitative approaches to estimating state instability. It builds on theory, joins trends and triggers into a logic of probability, and results in judgments able to inform policy, plans, and strategy.

The method is a framework, not a formula. It structures analytic processes to facilitate transparency and debate, generate wider considerations, and permit assumptions checks. It still leaves the analysis in the hands of analysts. Only its users can provide the expertise needed to make it work.

The method works within a behavioral understanding of political stability, which is focused on acts, roles, regularity, and gaps.[14] An act is political to the extent that it influences the distribution of power within a state. But its meaning—stabilizing or destabilizing—rests in its relationship to its context, specifically, formal and informal roles ("Does the act violate legal or social expectations?") and regularity ("Does the act break from its own past patterns?"). To a greater or lesser degree, role-breaking or irregular acts represent occurrences of instability; they challenge rather than affirm the distribution of power within a state.

While current intelligence might focus on the occurrence of role violations, estimates must look at their potential. The behavioral definition of instability is focused on potential.

> *Political stability is the degree to which the formal and informal coincide.… When the formal roles and structures set by authority match those constructed by informal social interaction, an object is stable. When either set of roles or structures change so they conflict, an object is unstable to some degree.… Perfect stability is total correlation; perfect instability, the total absence of correlation.*[15]

The size of the gap between formal and informal roles fairly represents a state's potential for instability. This is the correspondence between law and custom, between the expectations of the state and the expectations of society. When divided, they place people and institutions in tension and set one role against another, making disruptions more likely.

Governments and societies usually narrow this gap through four stabilizing dynamics that work to realign formal and informal roles.

- The state can enforce its set of roles on society by using its *authority*. It may pass laws and enforce them with security forces, for example.
- The state can reform its roles to match society through *resilience*. It may change laws in response to social pressure, for example, or expand its role suddenly to respond to urgent needs in a crisis.
- Society can recognize and accept the roles set by the state through *legitimacy*. It may accept new challenges such as taxes or rationing, for example, out of a belief in the state's right to rule on such matters.

- Society can enforce its set of roles on the state by attempts at *replacement*. It may reject incumbents at the polls, for example.

The failure of these four stabilizing dynamics does not automatically lead to instability events, however. Often, *opportunity* is also needed to convert existing tension into acts of instability. Beyond the gap, some social, economic, and environmental conditions correlate highly with acts of instability. They are not causes, but they are key enablers.[16]

Three of these four stabilizing dynamics lend themselves to analysis as scenario types and trends: authority, resilience, and legitimacy. Their development over time determines a country's vulnerability and the shapes of potential instability crises. (International events matter to the extent that they influence these three trends.) Opportunity is important as an additional consideration.

Scenario types

The needs of leaders require disaggregating the elements of instability. Too often, analysts lump together crises that policymakers never would—coups and protests, for example, or civil war and genocide.[a] [17] Different instability crises imply different policy responses. Intelligence assessments should provide insight into these different types of crises.

Generic scenario types are more helpful than detailed forecasts. Specific futures are endless, with details certain to be situation-dependent. In contrast, generic scenario types can capture sets of expectations while remaining flexible and allowing for structured estimates of impact.

Three policy-relevant types of instability are important. Each assumes a failure of one trend, or stabilizing dynamic. While the model identifies four, three are acute and would be likely to challenge US policy.[b]

- First, a crisis of *authority* refers to a state's inability to enforce its rule. Here, a state cannot control all of the area or enforce all of the laws it claims. Though not exclusively, this often emerges from elite-level dynamics, e.g., leadership weakness or divisions. Coups d'état, secession conflicts, and civil wars are all examples of crises of authority.



[a] The PITF, for example, groups together civil wars, adverse regime changes (authoritarian backslide, revolution, state failure), and genocide in its handling of instability.

[b] In the behavioral model, a crisis of "replacement" would be a leadership's persistence beyond its natural term, thus cancelling the stabilizing dynamic of replacement. Crises of this kind are likely to evolve slowly and are less likely than the other types to threaten US national interests.

- Second, a crisis of *resilience* refers to a state's ability to adapt. Here, a state cannot meet its basic responsibilities and is unable to change its pattern of relationships with society. Again, not exclusively, this is often an institutional-level dynamic, clearest in state failure, policy failures or deadlocks, and impotent responses to natural disasters, for example.

- Third, a crisis of *legitimacy* refers to a society's view that a regime has lost the right to rule because it is wrong or unjust. Though such a crisis affects everyone, this is often a popular-level dynamic, clearest in protests, revolutions, and insurgencies.

These scenario types overlap and are interrelated, as shown in the examples from East Asian history below. Though artificial, the separation of instability types helps to give structure to analysis.[18]

Probability: Trends and Triggers

The probability of a state's falling into instability is a function of "trends" (which measure broad patterns in authority, resilience, and legitimacy over time) and "triggers" (events likely to precipitate state instability). The lower a state's authority, resilience, or legitimacy, the less potent a triggering event would have to be to disrupt stability. The impact of a self-immolation, for example, is less likely to spread in a state able to crack down effectively on dissent (authority), adjust its policies (resilience), or rely on the support of the majority (legitimacy). Thus, a self-immolation caused a crisis in Tunisia, where the gaps in these dynamics were wide.

To measure trends, indicators appropriate to each state are required. (An indicator related to religion, such as clerical approval, will better reflect conditions in Syria, for example, than it would in Japan.) As in the Stability Assessment Framework, periodic scoring along a defined, coded scale permits creation of graphs to ease pattern recognition and

Hypothetical Indicators Tables and Graph

Dynamic: Legitimacy	
Sub-indicator: Values	
9	**Extremely high** Citizens willingly internalize and defend national ideology and values reflected in government policy. Religious, identity, or ethnic-based grievances are very rare or non-existent.
8	**Very high**
7	**High** Citizens feel the government corresponds with their values generally, even if they disagree on some policies. Appeals to narrow religious, identity, or ethnic issues are unsuccessful.
6	**Significant**
5	**Moderate** Citizens accept government ideology and policies as reflecting many social values. Appeals to narrow religious, identity, or ethnic issues find a limited audience, leading to isolated tension.
4	**Adequate**
3	**Low** Citizens doubt whether their leaders—indeed, the state—share their values, and question government policy as a result. Religious, identity, or ethnic-based grievances strain social order.
2	**Very low**
1	**Extremely low** Citizens reject the values underwriting national ideology and policy, and debate the right of the government to rule. Religious, identity, or ethnic issues divide the state and society.

	Period 1	Period 2	Period 3	Period 4
Authority	8.0	8.2	7.9	7.8
Indicator 1	9	9	9	8
Indicator 2	8	8	8	8
Etc				
Resilience	7.4	6.5	5.2	4.7
Indicator 1	7	7	6	5
Etc				

10.0 = Highest; 0.0 = Lowest



comparative analysis. (See examples on preceding page.)

The interpretation of trend graphs is necessarily comparative, usually over time and within states, as patterns will mean different things for different states, regime types, and cultures. In a democratic or traditionally localized society, for example, a low authority trend may not suggest vulnerability. In that same state, however, a declining authority trend will signal an increased risk of instability, as it is low relative to its own historical baseline.

Occasionally, comparisons may be revealing, especially among uniquely similar states or historical cases of instability. A trend comparison between postcommunist systems in China and Vietnam, for example, may yield insight. Similarly, the analysis of historical patterns in East European states before the collapse of their communist systems may test conclusions drawn from within-state analysis.

The trend graph also hints at likely scenario types. A country with resilience- and legitimacy-centered vulnerabilities—as in the hypothetical examples in the foregoing graph—is less likely to experience a crisis of authority. These patterns of vulnerability can suggest that the probability of a crisis has increased.

There still remains the problem of identifying triggers, a difficult challenge for two reasons. First, triggers historically have been difficult to predict. There was no reason to think that the removal of fuel subsidies would cause protests in Burma in 2007, for example, or that the self-immolation of the street vendor in Tunisia would precipitate the events it did.

Second, neither the probability nor the impact of potential trigger events is constant. Instead, different combinations of declining trends enable and shape different kinds of triggers. Police corruption that constrains authority, for example, may raise the probability that a confrontation will develop into a protest and increase the size and effect of that protest once it has begun. As a result, conventional probability-and-impact assessments of specific trigger events are misleading. They assume that characteristics of triggers are constant when they are not.

Despite these challenges, triggers can be estimated. As social catalysts, they have wider meaning only insofar as they occur in contexts primed for reaction and interaction. Trigger analysis should focus on contexts instead of specific events. (This context of local conditions is similar to the opportunity dynamic of the behavioral definition of instability.)

The four clearest practical contexts in which triggers might spark instability are elite division, policy deadlock, public awareness, and social trust. Within *authority*, a divided elite is much more vulnerable to sudden stresses than a united one. Within *resilience*, policy deadlock paralyzes a state's ability to respond to change. And, within *legitimacy*, public awareness and social trust—information and a way to discuss it—facilitate popular mobilization.

These local conditions set the context for trigger events. If conditions would allow a trend-enabled trigger to spread, its probability of sparking instability events rises. Conversely, if they would not, an event may occur in a context of vulnerability without developing into a trigger. The below table presents a hypothetical pattern analysis of practical conditions, coded along a defined scale.

The final estimate of probability draws on both broad trends of vulnerability over time and the degree to which practical conditions are affected by the catalytic action of triggers. The estimate includes absolute and

	Period 1	Period 2	Period 3	Period 4
Practical conditions	8.0	7.5	7.0	6.5
Elite unity	9	9	9	8
Policy pragmatism	6	5	5	4
Public uninformed	8	7	6	6
Social suspicion	9	9	8	8

10.0 = Highest; 0.0 = Lowest

relative assessments of the probability of each scenario type emerging. Importantly, the judgments remain those of the analyst, and they are not prescriptive but encourage the transparency, debate, wider considerations, and assumption checks of good analytic tradecraft.

Impact: Responses and Consequences

The impact of state instability is a function of group responses and consequences. Unlike probability, which focuses on a single point of time (the onset of instability), impact centers on an extended period of time (the duration of instability). As a result, it is a relative mess of contingent futures, multiplying over several "rounds" of interaction. Only first-round responses and consequences can be estimated; second-round estimates lose their specificity.

The first-round analysis of actors uses a two-by-two matrix to develop course-of-action types. Like scenario types, these are more useful as generic futures than as specific scenarios. Identified through brainstorming and discussion, the two most important variables affecting a group's response can be joined to form two crossed axes, creating four conceptually distinct potential course-of-action types. The matrix below provides an example of options available to a state neighboring another in distress. The responses of multiple actors such as key leaders, social groups, or military units may be of equal importance to policymakers and can also be the subject of analysis.

These are only generic options and have little meaning outside of the context of each scenario type. Context shapes the operational details of each course of action. Within a neighbor's response, for example, different kinds of military units might be deployed to secure the borders in a crisis of legitimacy than would be deployed in an intervention to stem the flow of refugees in a crisis of authority. The table in the upper left of the next page presents a framework combining response types with context.

This framework enables judgments of impact that are critical to policymakers, planners, and strategists. Read by column, it identifies a group's most likely and least likely response types, setting baseline assumptions for planning. Read by row, it provides a fragment that, when combined with other groups' courses of action, establishes baseline expectations of particular scenario types.

A similar approach can be used to estimate consequences. Here, however, the range of consequences cannot be reduced to four "types." The impersonal effects of instability—crime, social division, deteriorating infrastructure, etc.—are too scattered, scenario-dependent, varied, and of irregular importance to shrink into just four categories.

A better organizing principle is policymaker interest—a focus not on the details of consequences but on the conditions needed to implement potential policy initiatives. For instability, this interest is represented







most reliably by doctrine. The US Army Field Manual 3.07, *Stability Operations*, identifies 38 stability tasks that could be used to answer two of policymakers' most difficult questions: "Do we need to act?" and "When is it best to act?"[19]

In response to the first question, doctrinal stability tasks can be reframed to represent policy values and then judged according to the degree to which they are at risk. Together with more traditional interests, this provides a means to estimate stakes. Values and interests likely to be at risk imply a need to act; those likely to remain safe imply that other options may remain open. (See table on the right.[20])

In response to the second question, stability tasks can be reframed to represent key conditions and then judged by the degree to which they would help or hinder a proposed policy. This leads to estimates of timing. Conditions challenging a proposal suggest a need to wait; conditions favorable to it imply an opportunity to act. (See table on next page, which shows select stability tasks in the context of conditions in a location.)[21]

But these tools are limited. They estimate only the first round of many in the likely interactions between groups and consequences. Rapidly multiplying contingent futures prevent a second- or third-round estimate. This is an opportunity for future methodological development.

The final estimate of impact not only presents the most dangerous and the most favorable (least dangerous) group course-of-action and consequence types, but it also brings them together to develop the most dangerous and the most favorable scenario types. Along the way, it ensures transparency, debate, wider consideration, and assumptions checks in a process that remains centered on the analyst.

Overall Estimate: So What?

Together, these tools could be used to generate a summary estimate of state instability for policymakers that not only outlines probabilities of broadly



defined threats but also identifies the most likely, most dangerous, highest risk, and most favorable instability scenario types; the likely responses of key actors; and an evaluation of conditions that would help shape their decisions.

These judgments reach several audiences. They support policymakers with a more complete estimate of a potential instability crisis. They support planners with a planning case (most likely), hedging case (most dangerous), and testing cases (combinations of others). And, last, they support strategists by identifying challenges or conditions likely to result from instability ahead of time, allowing them to develop strategies earlier, before a crisis inspires a rush to action.

These needs are real. Almost two weeks into the protests that destabilized Egypt in early 2011, for instance, a frustrated American official vented to David Sanger of the *New York Times*. "This is what happens when you get caught by surprise," he or she said. "We've had endless strategy sessions for the past two years on Mideast Peace, on containing Iran," the official continued, "and how many of them factored in the possibility that Egypt… moves from stability to turmoil? None."[22]

To expand on the official's words, the early response to "Arab Spring" is what happens when policymakers are caught not only by surprise, but without adequate analytic ground to stand on. In hindsight, it is hard to conclude that a structured qualitative estimate of state instability for each major country in the region would not have given American strategists what they needed to better prepare for instability in Egypt and across the Middle East.

Reducing Uncertainty

For all of these potential benefits, the approach outlined here remains imperfect. Even in the hands of outstanding analysts, it would probably not achieve the prediction rates reported by quantitative models like the PITF. And it cannot forecast exact operational details or second-round consequences. By necessity, state instability will remain to some degree unpredictable.

But, as Sherman Kent, the father of estimative intelligence, once wrote, "estimating is what you do when you do not know."[23] State instability may remain at least partially unpredictable, but it need not remain uninvestigated. The structured qualitative method advanced here takes another step toward removing some of that uncertainty; opening up the analytic process to increase transparency, debate, wider consideration, and assumptions checks; providing policymakers, planners, and strategists the intelligence support they need; and reducing not just surprise, but the policy paralysis that too often follows state instability.

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Endnotes

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3. Rachel Martin, "Egypt Unrest: Didn't U.S. Intelligence See it Coming?" National Public Radio, February 5, 2011, http://www.npr.org/2011/02/05/133510910/intelligence-officials-face-hard-questions-on-egypt.

4. For a helpful introduction to some of these approaches, see Frederick Barton and Karin von Hippel, "Early Warning? A Review of Conflict Prediction Models and Systems," PCR Project Special Briefing, Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 2008. This paper is available for download at http://csis.org/publication/early-warning.

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6. Sean O'Brien, "Anticipating the Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: An Early Warning Approach to Conflict and Instability Analysis," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46, no. 6 (2002); Sean O'Brien, "Crisis Early Warning and Decision Support: Contemporary Approaches and Thoughts on Future Research," *International Studies Review* 12 (2010); and Jack Goldstone et al., "A Global Forecasting Model for Political Instability," *American Journal of Political Science* 54, no.1 (2010). Another significant predictive model developed outside of government is the University of Maryland's biennial report: Joseph Hewitt, Jonathan Wilkenfeld, and Ted Gurr, *Peace and Conflict*, 2010, Center for International Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland, 2010.

7. David Carment et al., "The 2006 Country Indicators for Foreign Policy: Opportunities and Challenges for Canada," *Canadian Foreign Policy* 13, no.1 (2006); David Carment, "2008/2009 Country Indicators for Foreign Policy Fragile States Index," *Dispatch* 7 no.1 (2009); Economist Intelligence Unit, "Social Unrest," *EIU ViewsWire*, 2011 <http://viewswire.eiu.com/site_info.asp?info_name=social_unrest_table&page=noads&rf=0>; "About Eurasia Group's Global Political Risk Index," Reuters Blog: Andrew Marshall, Aug 2010 <blogs.reuters.com/andrew-marshall>(no longer available); Susan Rice and Stewart Patrick, "Index of State Weakness in the Developing World," Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, 2008 (This paper is available for download at http://www.brookings.edu/reports/2008/02_weak_states_index.aspx); Monty Marshall and Benjamin Cole, "Global Report 2009: Conflict, Governance, and State Fragility," Center for Systemic Peace, George Mason University, 2009 (This paper is available for download at http://www.systemicpeace.org/peace.htm); "The Failed States Index 2010 Interactive Grid," Fund for Peace 2010 (This paper is available for download at http://www.fundforpeace.org/global/?q=fsi-grid2010).

8. O'Brien, "The Good, The Bad, and the Ugly," 804; O'Brien, "Crisis Early Warning," 94–97; Goldstone et al., "A Global Forecasting Model," 196–7.

9. The rankings for the State Fragility Index are unusual due to the index's ranking system, which can group several states together in one tier; the ranking used is the highest (least stable) possible for each state's group, thus allowing two states in the same group to share the same rank. (For the purpose of the table on page 3, this gives "tied" states the benefit of the doubt, or the highest possible ranking.) "The Failed States Index 2007," *Foreign Policy* 161 (2007); "The Failed States Index 2008," *Foreign Policy* 167 (2008); "The Failed States Index," *Foreign Policy* 173 (2009); "The Failed States Index 2010," http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/06/21/2010_failed_states_index_interactive_map_and_rankings; Monty Marshall and Jack Goldstone, "Global Report on Conflict, Governance, and State Fragility 2007," *Foreign Policy Bulletin* (Winter 2007); Monty Marshall and Benjamin Cole, "Global Report on Conflict, Governance and State Fragility 2008," *Foreign Policy Bulletin* 18, no.1 (2008); Marshall and Cole, "Global Report 2009"; Economist Intelligence Unit, "Social Unrest"; and Rice and Patrick, "Index of State Weakness."

10. Barton and von Hippel report that "one [US government] official referred to the National Intelligence Council (NIC) watch list as 'conventional wisdom watch.'" Barton and von Hippel, "Early Warning?" 11.

11. O'Brien argues that effective support must include more than warning: "Forecasts of impending crises alone are insufficient; decisionmakers require informed insights into how the options at their disposal might mitigate, or even exacerbate, the crisis." O'Brien, "Crisis Early Warning," 88.

12. For more on the use of structural analogy models, see Goldstone, "Using Quantitative and Qualitative Models." For an example of a Delphi forecast of instability, see the focus on unification-by-absorption in Park Young-ho and Kim Hyeong-ki, "2010 Unification Clock: When We Will See a Unified Korea?" Korea Institute for National Unification, December 2010. (This paper is available for download at http://www.kinu.or.kr/eng/pub/pub_02_01.jsp?page=1&num=85&mode=view&field=&text=&order=&dir=&bid=DATA05&ses=.)

13. Central Intelligence Agency, "Indicators or Signposts of Change," *A Tradecraft Primer: Structured Analytic Techniques for Improving Intelligence Analysis*, March 2009, 12–13 <www.cia.gov>; Jonathan Goodhand, Tony Vaux, and Robert Walker, "Conducting Conflict Assessments: Guidance Notes," UK Department for International Development, Jan 2002; Suzanne Verstegen, Luc van de Goor, and Jeroen de Zeeuw, "The Stability Assessment Framework: Designing Integrated Responses for Security, Governance and Development," The Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, January 2005. (This paper is available for download at http://www.ssrnetwork.net/document_library/detail/3854/the-stability-assessment-framework-designing-integrated-responses-for-security-governance-and-development.)

14. J. Eli Margolis, "Understanding Political Stability and Instability," *Civil Wars* 12, no.3 (2010).

15. Ibid., 332.

16. Ibid., 337–38.

17. Goldstone et al., "A Global Forecasting Model," 191–92.

18. Researchers in other fields rely on similarly artificial heuristic types. The most helpful typology of authoritarian regimes, for example, often classifies them as mixed, or "hybrid." Barbara Geddes, "What Do We Know About Democratization After Twenty Years?" *Annual Review of Political Science* 2 (1999); Barbara Geddes, "Authoritarian Breakdown: Empirical Test of a Game Theoretic Argument," pape presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, GA, September 1999; and Natasha Ezrow and Erica Frantz, *Dictators and Dictatorships: Understanding Authoritarian Regimes and their Leaders* (New York: Continuum, 2011).

19. Chapter three introduces these stability tasks. US Army, "Stability Operations," *Field Manual* 3-07, October 2008.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.

22. David Sanger, "As Mubarak Digs in, U.S. Policy in Egypt is Complicated," *New York Times*, February 5, 2011.

23. Quoted in Loch Johnson, "Glimpses into the Gems of American Intelligence: The President's Daily Brief and the National Intelligence Estimate," *Intelligence and National Security* 23, no.3 (2008): 351.

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The *Glomar Explorer* in Film and Print

AZORIAN: The Raising of the K-129, written, directed, and produced by Michael White (Michael White Films, 2009).

Project AZORIAN: The CIA and the Raising of the K-129, by Norman Polmar and Michael White (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2010), 239 pages.

Reviewed by David Robarge

For years, CIA's involvement with the *Glomar Explorer* project, the technologically pathbreaking effort to use a specially designed ship to retrieve a sunken Soviet submarine from the Pacific Ocean floor in 1974, was one of the Agency's most open secrets. Much information about the vessel, usually referred to simply as the *Glomar*, and its mission has been publicly available since they were exposed in the press in 1975. Confusion and inaccuracies quickly emerged, however, over how the wreck was located, how much of it was raised, what was found in it, and what the payoff of the costly project was.

The first book written on the topic established one of the most persistent errors by misnaming the project JENNIFER (the codename for its security procedures) rather than AZORIAN.[1] Later works—based on insider interviews, leaked documents, and speculations of varying reliability—revealed new information but still fell short of being authoritative.[2] More recent titles have postulated unlikely scenarios to explain why the Soviet submarine was where it was when it sank—a favorite is that it had "gone rogue" and was headed toward the United States to launch nuclear missiles—and what caused it to do so.[3] Meanwhile, no detailed official information about the *Glomar* program was publicly available until CIA declassified one of several internal accounts in 2010.[4]

In the film *AZORIAN* and the companion book *Project AZORIAN*, military and intelligence historian Norman Polmar and documentarian Michael White have collaborated on the definitive accounts of this remarkable effort: using a battleship-sized, uniquely outfitted ship constructed under exceptionally tight security to salvage nuclear weapons and cryptographic equipment from a Soviet Golf-class submarine (the K-129) that sank in April 1968 approximately 1,500 miles northwest of Hawaii. It was the first strategic-missile submarine to have been lost and potentially had substantial intelligence value, but the odds against retrieving it seemed insurmountable. Before AZORIAN, the deepest ocean salvage of a ship was from 245 feet, and the only object known to have been recovered as far down as the K-129 lay was a satellite "bucket" weighing only several hundred pounds. The "target object," as the submarine was euphemistically called then, was nearly 17,000 feet underwater and weighed 2,000 tons. "Project AZORIAN was unquestionably the most ambitious and the most audacious ocean engineering effort ever attempted," Polmar and White rightly state. (xi)

In both the movie and the book, Polmar and White draw on a much wider range of sources than have previous chroniclers of the project, including the ship's logs, a declassified CIA history, other documents from US and Soviet

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in this article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.

sources, and extensive interviews with members of the crews of the *Glomar* and other vessels involved and with US naval intelligence officers and Soviet naval officers and scientists. Polmar and White put these new sources to excellent effect, presenting numerous fascinating and hitherto unpublicized or underappreciated facts about the planning, implementation, and accomplishments of AZORIAN. Among the most interesting insights:

- The K-129 probably sank because the rocket engines in two of its missiles ignited sequentially for unknown reasons and burned for more than three minutes over a six-minute time span. The exhaust plumes would have burned into the pressure hull and, with their extremely high temperatures and poisonous fumes, quickly killed all the crew. The misfirings occurred while the submarine was near the surface, with its internal compartments open for ventilation. After part of its sail structure tore away and its bottom was breached, it began to flood and then sank. While investigating the cause of the K-129's demise, Polmar and White refute alternative theories, such as a collision with or attack by a US nuclear submarine.

- The "acoustic events" that indicated something unusual had happened to the K-129 were identified not by the US Navy's underwater SOSUS (Sound Surveillance System) array but by hydrophones monitored by the Air Force's Technical Applications Center (AFTAC). SOSUS may have picked up the reverberations from the explosion, but they were unrecognizable to the operators because of their short duration. AFTAC's recorders, originally deployed to detect Soviet nuclear detonations, were 10 times more sensitive than the SOSUS displays.

- To keep the project going after four years of development with costs mounting and no immediate end in sight, DCI Richard Helms had to overcome strong opposition from the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the deputy secretary of defense, the chief of naval operations, and the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, who argued on grounds of cost, intelligence return, and likely diplomatic repercussions that AZORIAN should be cancelled. In late 1972 the DCI persuaded National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger and President Richard Nixon to the contrary, and the program continued without further bureaucratic resistance. In April and May 1974, just as the last tests of the *Glomar* were completed and the salvage operation was about to begin, the US Intelligence Board gave a final favorable evaluation of the project. On 7 June the president approved the mission with the caveat that the recovery itself not begin before he returned from a visit to Moscow on 3 July.

- On its way from the East Coast to southern California after transiting the Strait of Magellan—the ship was too wide for the Panama Canal—the *Glomar* entered the port of Valparaiso, Chile, on 12 September 1973, one day after a military junta overthrew the socialist government of Salvadore Allende, which had been the target of one of CIA's most notorious covert actions three years before. "Seven [Global Marine] technicians were to board the ship at Valparaiso. After checking in to their hotel, early on 11 September, the Global Marine personnel were awakened by the sounds of the revolution in the streets." (85) The declassified Agency account of AZORIAN notes that "The presence of a covert US intelligence ship in a Chilean port during the military coup was a bizarre coincidence quite unrelated to the rumors that 'the CIA had 200 agents in Chile for the sole purpose of ousting Allende.' There were no unfavorable incidents involving the ship, crew members, or the Global Marine representative[s]."[a5]

- If the Soviets had learned of the *Glomar*'s true mission and tried to disrupt the recovery, the ship would have been helpless because it had no protection within days of it. Ships of the Pacific Fleet were too far away to help unless warning of a threat to the *Glo-*

[a] Global Marine, Inc., was the California-based firm that oversaw the construction of the *Glomar*—hence the ship's name.

mar came well in advance. If, as Polmar and White assert, submarines were sent to deal with a Soviet challenge and possible seizure of the *Glomar*, their "only option [upon arrival on the scene] would be to sink the lift ship….The men on board the *Glomar* knew nothing of this plan." (106)

- Soviet ships started coming to the search area two weeks after the *Glomar* got there. The first was a missile range instrumentation ship, the *Chazhma*, whose crew took photographs from on deck and from a helicopter circling above the *Glomar*. The two ships exchanged messages, and the *Chazhma* left four days later. A Soviet naval tug, the *SB-10*, was more persistent, staying for nearly two weeks and coming as close as 200 yards.[a] It was nearby just as the capture vehicle—the 179-foot-by-31-foot claw designed to grasp the submarine[b]—was about to be pulled inside, raising fears that debris from the retrieved wreckage might float up around the *Glomar* and reveal what was happening. Nothing like that occurred, and the tug left abruptly. The released CIA account notes, "One can only conjecture the reaction and chagrin of Soviet authorities when they later realized that two Soviet Navy ships were on the scene and, in effect, witnessed the recovery operation against their lost submarine."[6]

- The capture vehicle had been pulled up over 6,700 feet when two of its grabber arms snapped, causing nearly 100 feet of the retrieved front section of the K-129 to break away and fall through the gap created. Back to the ocean floor went the missile, its fire control system, and possibly some cryptographic equipment—one of the most coveted prizes in the whole operation. Engineers determined that the failure had two causes: an additional million pounds of weight had to placed on the pipe string and capture vehicle to drive the arms deeper into the bottom soil because the seafloor was harder than expected; and the steel used for the grabber devices, although stronger and tougher than other structural steels, also was brittle, especially at low temperatures like those encountered at great ocean depths.

- As if living its cover through and through, the *Glomar* brought up some manganese nodules along with part of the submarine. They apparently had lodged between the pressure hull and the outer hull as the K-129 slid down a slope after reaching bottom. Despite an "absolutely no souvenirs" order to the crew, some of the nodules disappeared.

- Many photographs, drawings, and CGI images and animation enliven the book and movie, adding sometimes startling visual impact to the narrative and helping explain the almost unfathomable complexity of the challenge the project engineers faced.

Polmar and White add a human touch to the technology-heavy AZORIAN story by giving details about the K-129's crew and their living conditions aboard the vessel. Previous works about the *Glomar* often have gotten so caught up in engineering esoterica that, except for mentioning the retrieval of several bodies from the wreckage that were then buried at sea, readers might forget that many Soviet submariners perished in the mishap. The Soviet government told the crewmen's families only that they had drowned accidentally and did not allow their names to be published for more than 25 years. The 10-page appendix in the book gives details about each of them and serves as a haunting reminder of the dangers faced in the undersea Cold War.

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[a] The SB-10 attracted the attention of the *Glomar* crew in part because its crew included two women who frequently appeared on deck wearing dresses that they traded daily. A project engineer recalled that "the Global Marine people had lots of fun" with the tug's crew. "They would fill plastic trash bags with unclassified computer printouts that had to be disposed of anyway…[and] they would smear aqua lube over these papers—aqua lube [used on the threads of the three miles of pipes in the lift system] is the slipperiest substance known to man—stuff them into the plastic trash bag, tie it up, and throw it overboard. Sometimes they put a little acetylene in to make sure that it was buoyant…and it would skip across the waves as the wind took it….Whenever a bag of trash was thrown overboard, they would immediately go after it." (112)

[b] The capture vehicle was nicknamed "Clementine."

The descriptions of life aboard the *Glomar* also lighten the technical load of the story. The *Glomar*'s crew members got along well because of the comfortable living conditions and the camaraderie that developed around working together on a secret and historic mission. The *Glomar* was well outfitted with creature comforts: three recreation lounges with cards, games, color television sets, and videoplayers; an exercise room; a daily newspaper; and sumptuous food served four times a day, with the mess hall open around the clock. Polmar provides a menu on page 104 of the book.

While previous accounts have concentrated on the salvage operation itself, Polmar and White bring to the fore other important but overlooked aspects of the project. Among them was the construction of the world's largest submersible barge, the HMB-1 (Hughes Mining Barge No. 1), to hide the construction of the capture vehicle. After the capture vehicle was assembled, the HMB-1 and its "cargo" were towed next to the ship in a cove along Catalina Island. The transfer of the capture vehicle to the *Glomar* occurred at night to discourage curious swimmers and divers. The *Glomar* maneuvered over the HMB-1, whose roof was opened so the capture vehicle could be pulled up into the moon pool. The ship then moved out of the cove, carrying the capture vehicle and some unexpected passengers: thousands of squid attracted by the lights.

One of the most remarkable aspects of Project AZORIAN is that it was conducted simultaneously in secret and in the open, and, even with a tip from an anonymous (and still unidentified) source, the Soviets evidently did not act because such an operation seemed technical unfeasible (67–68). The security regime held up for more than five years. Polmar and White note that AZORIAN

> *was carried out under intense press scrutiny because the 'cover' for the salvage was a seafloor-mining project sponsored by the notorious Howard Hughes. Thus, the salvage of the K-129, besides being of unprecedented scope and depth, was conducted in the public view and with intensive Soviet naval surveillance and with the Soviet embassy in Washington, DC, having been previously notified. (xii)*

Polmar and White were unable to determine who came up with the idea of having Hughes "sponsor" the operation, but they rightly observe that "the Hughes empire was the perfect 'front' for the endeavor; it was a collection of privately owned corporations, not responsible to stockholders or to the Securities Exchange Commission." Moreover, Hughes was known for undertaking exotic projects, such as building the enormous wooden aircraft dubbed the "Spruce Goose."

AZORIAN was not compromised until February 1975, when the *Los Angeles Times* ran a story that the offices of a Hughes company (the Summa Corporation) that provided cover for the project had been broken into in June 1974 and a document about the *Glomar* stolen.[a] Already dealing with the heartbreaking failure to retrieve all of the sunken submarine, beleaguered Director of Central Intelligence William Colby for several months had dissuaded members of the media from writing about the burglary, which they learned about from the Los Angeles Police Department. Then the *Times* published its somewhat garbled account (it had the operation occurring in the Atlantic Ocean, among other errors), and syndicated columnist Jack Anderson pieced together the full story, rejected a personal appeal from Colby to spike it, and broadcast it nationwide. A media frenzy quickly developed in southern California where the *Glomar* was berthed. AZORIAN's deputy mission director recalled that

> *local, regional and national news reporters poured into the Long Beach area….Reporters frequented the Long Beach bars and tried all the arts and tricks of their trade to find knowledgeable sources and persuade them to talk. Waterfront hangers on were plied with drinks, and prostitutes were enlisted in attempts to buy crew lists. Crew members were pestered, badgered and propositioned.*[7]

[a] The *Glomar*-related document apparently never left the building; a security guard found it and later destroyed it. (138)

At the time, Anderson said he publicized the operation because "Navy experts have told us that the sunken sub contains no real secrets and that the project, therefore, is a waste of the taxpayers' money."[8] Because of the leaks and the charges that AZORIAN had not been worth its great expense, the White House decided to kill Colby's proposal for a second *Glomar* mission, codenamed MATADOR, to raise the portion of the submarine that had broken off.

Few shortcomings detract from Polmar and White's authoritative two-part work. At times Polmar, the principal author of *Project AZORIAN*, tries too hard to display his expertise about warships and naval history. The third chapter, a "biography" of two submarines involved with AZORIAN, is superfluous, as are some of the appendices with detail about Soviet submarines and their operations. The book fails to mention the A-12 along with the U-2 and the SR-71 as one of the aeronautical achievements of the Lockheed "Skunk Works," which built the capture vehicle. Cinematically, White's movie is well produced and keeps the viewer's attention. Some of the engineering sections drag a bit, but the segment in which participants revisit some key decisions shows some unintentionally amusing blame-passing.

A former US naval intelligence officer told Polmar and White that "AZORIAN was a great gamble, displaying the actions of a confident country with the wealth and the will to make such a gamble if the potential gain would make the effort worthwhile." (171) Based on the intelligence acquired, was the AZORIAN gamble worth the cost? The arguments on either side are largely *ex post facto* because no one knows for sure what intelligence of what potential value was lost when only a part of the K-29 was recovered and MATADOR was cancelled. The Agency account concludes that "To attempt to evaluate Project AZORIAN in terms of costs and benefits, one must consider not only the immediate intelligence … but the broader aspects and achievements as well"—the development of "an advanced deep–ocean system with important future economic, political, and strategic potential for the United States."[9]

On the intelligence side, Polmar and White correctly assess that AZORIAN failed at its primary mission. After the second mission was scrubbed, the *Glomar* drifted from owner to owner for two decades, first with the US Navy's Maritime Administration, then briefly with the Global Marine Development Corporation for deep sea drilling, then back to the Maritime Administration to spend 18 years laid up in a bay in California, and finally over to the GlobalSantaFe Corporation for 10 years of more deep-sea drilling. In 2007 that firm merged with Transocean, which bought the *Glomar*—renamed the *GSF Explorer*—from the US Government for $20 million. It now works under contract for oil companies on drilling projects around the world. "In a way," Polmar and White aptly conclude, "the ship is performing the role for which she was originally publicized—exploiting the resources of the ocean floor." (147)

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Endnotes

1. Clyde W. Burleson, *The Jennifer Project* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1977). Jennifer was the name of the daughter of a US Navy officer who suggested it as a cryptonym for AZORIAN's security compartment. Polmar and White, 63. In his biography of DCI William Colby, John Prados compounds the error by saying that the overall project name Jennifer was later changed to Zodiac. *Lost Crusader: The Secret Wars of CIA Director William Colby* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 267.

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3. John P. Craven, *The Silent War: The Cold War Battle Beneath the Sea* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001); Kenneth Sewell and Clint Richmond, *Red Star Rogue: The Untold Story of a Soviet Submarine's Nuclear Strike Attempt on the U.S.* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2005); Viktor Dygalo, *A Rear Admiral's Notes* (Moscow: Kuchkovo Pole, 2009); Peter A. Huchthausen and Alexandre Sheldon-Duplaix, *Hide and Seek: The Untold Story of Cold War Naval Espionage* (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2009); Craig W. Reed, *Red November: Inside the Secret U.S.-Soviet Submarine War* (New York: William Morrow, 2010).

4. "Project AZORIAN: The Story of the Hughes Glomar Explorer," *Studies in Intelligence* 22, No. 3 (Fall 1978): 1–50; declassified 2010. In the several years after the first media disclosures about the project in 1975, CIA acknowledged that it ? ad used the *Glomar* for intelligence purposes and named the contractors involved in its construction but would release no other details. The "neither confirm nor deny" phrase the Agency uses when responding to document search requests has come to be known in information management parlance as the "Glomar response." "Glomar Chronology-Releases," 8 July 1999, copy in History Staff files.

5. "Project AZORIAN," 24.

6. Ibid., 46.

7. Harold R. Ford, *William E. Colby as Director of Central Intelligence, 1973–1976* (Washington, DC: CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1993; declassified 2011), 185. Colby focuses on the security and publicity aspects of AZORIAN, rather than the salvage effort, in his memoir. *Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1978), 413–18.

8. Ford, 187.

9. "Project AZORIAN," 49. (U)

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No More Secrets: Open Source Information and the Reshaping of U.S. Intelligence

Hamilton Bean, (Santa Barbara CA: Praeger, 2011), 218 pp, bibliography, index.

Reviewed by Anthony Olcott

Author Hamilton Bean never really delivers on what is promised in the title of this book. He neither examines what "open source information" might mean in relationship to intelligence, nor does he explain what he means by "No More Secrets." Is this a description of information abundance? An exhortation to cultural change within the Intelligence Community (IC)? Something else?

Bean writes that for a time he worked at a small contracting company that provided what was basically a clipping service to its mostly military clients by culling newspapers and other open sources for materials the company presumed met its customers' open source intelligence (OSINT) requirements. After the company was sold, Bean returned to school, earned a PhD in communications, and turned to more academic pursuits, such as writing this book.

After a short, even perfunctory, history of the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), most of it taken from *Studies in Intelligence* articles or Joseph Roop's history posted on cia.gov,[a] the bulk of Bean's book is an examination of the period between the 9/11 attacks in 2001 and the Director of National Intelligence's (DNI) Open Source Conference in 2008, a period that included the conversion of FBIS into the DNI's Open Source Center (OSC).

As Bean explains, there was considerable pressure then to get the IC to use more open source information–the 9/11 Commission had called for the creation of an "Open Source Agency" equal to the CIA, and the WMD Commission later (2005) urged the creation of an Open Source Directorate within CIA. What resulted instead was the National Open Source Enterprise (known by the unhappy acronym NOSE) within the DNI. The DNI continued to oversee OSC, which became part of the NOSE but remained little changed from its predecessor.

Bean uses what he calls "discourse analysis" to examine the process by which OSC came to be, studying not the substance of OSINT, but rather the various ways participants in the process talked or wrote about it. Viewed in an institutional framework, the primary challenge for the new organization was not how to make better use of the vast quantities of freely available information, but rather to find presentational ways to make the material more acceptable to the rest of the IC. One of these was to restrict the availability of its products. This, Bean asserts, played to IC values, which favor the secret over the open. In his words: "OSC may not necessarily require its current level of secrecy to operate effectively, but that secrecy encourages intelligence stakeholders to view OSC as legitimate." (43)

In Bean's view, the recipients of intelligence, "the customers," are more focused on the *form* in which they receive information than they are in its content or possible uses. The reason for this, he argues, is that intelligence has an

[a] https://www.cia/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/foreign-broadcast-information-service/index.html

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institutional dimension, marking those who receive it (just as it does those who produce it) as distinct from other people. The greatest challenge of open source information, in this view, is not the mind-boggling quantities of information or the complex epistemological issue of what part of that ocean of information will help answer particular questions, but rather how to preserve the "specialness" of intelligence when it is derived from sources that anyone can access.

Where that challenge shows most plainly, in Bean's view, is in the struggle over "information sharing." The ease with which unclassified materials may be shared is one of the major arguments usually given in favor of open source, but it is precisely the loss of exclusivity that makes users and practitioners reluctant to loosen their grip on information products. In Bean's account, the various contradictions and conflicts show most clearly in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which had a former head of intelligence and analysis, whom Bean described as having a "mind-set to stay on the dark side," as well as others who believed that material should go to "every cop on the street." (96) The pattern Bean describes is one of "officials…simply asserting the need for a culture of information sharing within and among federal, state, and local agencies" while "gloss[ing] over critical differences that influence stakeholders' perceptions and practices" (96-97). The result is that many DHS units pay lip service to meet "the minimum standard [to] improve OSINT," mostly by contracting out open source collection to commercial providers while keeping the efforts "minimally resourced" (100), a practice that even the contractors characterize as "check the box" exercises. (99).

Unfortunately for his argument, Bean does not offer examples of how open source information might be better used. Arguably, this could be a product of Bean's willingness to take "intelligence" as something with a clear definition, which results in some way from the working out of the "intelligence cycle." Add more OSINT to collection, Bean seems to argue, and "analysis" will improve. However, even within that narrow definition of what open source information might add to the production of intelligence, Bean is convinced that institutional structures and cultural constraints are such that "institutional insecurity regarding the worth of open source and its status as a legitimate form of intelligence endures" (161).

In the end, this reviewer is left puzzled, though definitely intrigued. Are Bean's long paragraphs and jargon-filled prose simply a product of academic turgidity, or has he contrived to conceal a sly but ultimately quite damning argument about the place of OSINT in the IC?

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KLO ui Hangukchon Pisa [Secret History of the KLO in the Korean War]

Yi Chang-gon.[a] (Seoul: Jisungsa, 2005), 492 pp., illustrations.

Reviewed by Stephen C. Mercado

Among the unknown veterans of the Forgotten War fought up and down the Korean peninsula during 1950–53, perhaps none remain so in the shadows today as those of the Korean Liaison Office (KLO). The book reviewed here is a collection of war stories from survivors of that covert organization. Because these Korean veterans gathered intelligence and executed special operations under command of the US Army, they suffered neglect and even persecution after the armistice. As Northerners with no military service record in South Korea, most survivors chose to live out their lives in the United States rather than suffer the indignities of postwar life among neighbors who shunned them as shirkers and officials who monitored them as suspected double agents. Dr. Yi Chang-gon, KLO veteran and vice chairman of the main KLO veterans association, wrote this work with Choe Kyu-bong, the association's chairman and a former KLO operations commander. The book comprises three main parts: Choe's memoirs, brief recollections of two dozen veterans, and Yi's story.

The KLO's origin lies in the bitter conflict between leftist and rightist forces in the Soviet and American zones of occupied Korea following the nation's liberation from Japanese rule at the end of the Second World War. Landowners, Christians, and other privileged northerners struggled in vain against the hostile communist regime that Moscow imposed in Pyongyang. Many took refuge south of the 38th parallel in the US zone. From this displaced population emerged paramilitary "youth associations," whose members carried out terrorist operations in both zones, such as the assassination attempt of 1 March 1946 in Pyongyang against communist Korean leader Kim Il-song.[1]

Beginning early in the occupation, the US Army in Korea used these groups to gather intelligence in the Soviet zone. In 1948, the Republic of Korea (ROK) and its armed forces were established in the south. The following year, Maj. Gen. Charles Willoughby, G-2 for General MacArthur in Tokyo, secretly established the KLO in Seoul. With these developments came the end of the paramilitary youth groups; some of their members moved into the ROK military and police forces, and others joined the KLO.[2] Choe Kyu-bong, a Wonsan native active in the rightist White Shirt Society (WSS) in Seoul, cast his lot with the KLO after a period of service with the US Army Counterintelligence Corps (CIC).[3] Choe recalled with pride the many KLO intelligence reports on Pyongyang's war preparations and decried the lack of an audience for them in Tokyo or Washington.[4]

The KLO's wartime feats included preparing the way for the remarkable US amphibious assault at Inchon on 15 September 1950, which broke the back of the nearly successful campaign of the Korean People's Army (KPA) to conquer the south. Under US Navy Lt. Eugene Clark, operatives of the KLO served alongside

[a] Names of Koreans are written here in conventional order, given name following family name. Apart from Seoul and the name of the publishing company, all Korean names in this review are rendered in the conventional McCune-Reischauer system, minus the diacritic marks.

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members of Willoughby's clandestine operatives in his Z Unit, the US Army and Navy, and the CIA for several weeks to gather intelligence on mines, tides, water depths, and enemy fortifications, as well as other data required for the invasion of Inchon.[5] The night before D-Day, Choe, a KLO unit commander, participated with Clark, ROK Army Col. Kye In-ju, ROK Navy Lt. Yon Jong, and others in an armed assault to seize the lighthouse on Palmi-do, an island at the entrance to the port of Inchon, and to light the lamp at midnight. Choe, shot twice in the night attack on the structure, found in the darkness a missing piece of equipment that for some anxious minutes had left the team unable to turn on the guiding light. Thanks to Choe's efforts, MacArthur's amphibious task force saw the light and observed the Stars and Stripes flying from the lighthouse at dawn. For his part in the operation, Choe received an audience with MacArthur aboard the flagship *Mt. McKinley* and was given the flag that had flown from the lighthouse.[6]

The book offers glimpses of other wartime operations as well. Choe recalled KLO operatives in KPA uniforms going ashore in Wonsan as part of an effort to determine the accuracy of worrisome rumors of bubonic plague in North Korea. On Choe's orders, the men beached their craft, infiltrated a hospital, browbeat the staff into showing them the patient records, and left with two patients showing symptoms similar to those of the plague. Engaging a KPA patrol in a fire fight on their way back to the beach, the team lost a member to enemy fire before escaping.[a] Their operation helped medical experts to conclude that the rumored bubonic plague was in reality typhoid.

The book also abounds in details on the covert war in Korea. Choe recounted how he joined two US Army officers from Tokyo in spiriting away Kye In-ju from a ROK prison in which he was facing a death sentence for dereliction of duty. The trio claimed that they needed to take him to their jeep to record his confession on special equipment and then sped away before the surprised guards could stop them; Kye became the senior Korean officer in the KLO.[b] The book also touches on Tokyo's role in providing identification documents, uniforms, and other materials of agent authentication; an operation in which a KLO team recovered a downed Soviet MiG fighter for US technical analysis; and the acquisition of North Korean newspapers for use in psychological warfare operations. Among the many grim details appears a bit of humor, an episode in which a Korean-American interpreter informed Korean operatives training at an unnamed atoll in the Marshall Islands that their American instructor had just made a joke, that he would not be translating it, and that that they would all laugh with him on the count of three.

The KLO rose to great heights before its sudden end. Rooted in paramilitary groups of northern refugees working with the US Army CIC, the KLO grew during the war into part of an arrangement in which the US Army's Liaison Detachment oversaw both intelligence and partisan operations.[7] The signing of the armistice in 1953 cut KLO members off from their families and friends in the north. The US Army transferred the operatives that year to the ROK Army, which promptly turned most of them loose. Some of the short profiles of the two dozen veterans in the book include complaints of being "dumped into society" with no resources. Without public records of military service, and facing indifference and suspicion as northerners, most KLO survivors left for the United States, where a number banded together to form the KLO 8240th Army Unit Veterans Association, USA. Even Kye moved to California. Little remains of these veterans' legacy. At Palmi-do, a plaque dedicated to the memory of the KLO stands next to the lighthouse. In Norfolk, the flag that Choe MacArthur had given Choe at Inchon is on exhibit in a glass case at the MacArthur Memorial.

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[a] Separately, a team including Eugene Clark, Yon Jong, and Brigadier General Crawford Sams conducted a similar operation.

[b] Kye in his memoir wrote that he gained his freedom when a US Army colonel demanded his release in a telephone call to ROK Army Chief of Staff Chong Il-gwon. Whatever the details, Kye exchanged a prison cell for a privileged position in wartime US military intelligence.

This book lacks statistics, maps, government records, and a bibliography, all of which one finds in official US and ROK military histories of the war. It includes many photographs, however, and this reviewer finds most compelling a picture taken soon after the storming of the Palmi-do lighthouse. Lt. Clark, Lt. Yon Jong, Choe Kyu-bong, and Col. Kye In-je are with other members of their team on a boat heading to the flagship *Mt. McKinley* in their moment of victory. On their faces appear expressions of triumph, relief, and fatigue. This and the book's other photographs give readers a greater sense of the triumphs and sorrows of Koreans who fought in the shadows.

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Endnotes

1. See Andrei Lankov, *From Stalin to Kim Il Sung: The Formation of North Korea, 1945–1960* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2002), 25. The attempt failed when Soviet Lt. Yakov Novichenko fielded the assassin group's grenade, at the cost of his hand, an act later commemorated in the 1986 Soviet-DPRK film *Sukunda na Podvig* (Seconds Make a Hero).

2. One prominent case is that of Kim Tong-sok, who, leaving the Taedong Youth Association at his leader's recommendation to enroll in the Military Academy, became a leading intelligence officer of the ROK Army. See my review of Yi Son-ho and Chu Chong-yon, *Kim Tong-sok: I Saram!* (Seoul: Atukom, 2005) in *Intelligence and National Security*, 21:6 (December 2006): 1082–83.

3. For discussion of ties between the WSS and the US Army, also see Yi Wan-bom, "Paeguisa wa KLO ui Hwaldong ul Tonghaeso Pon Namhan Taebuk Chongbo Hwaldong ui Wollyu (1945–1953)" [Origins of South Korea's Intelligence Activities Against North Korea as Seen in the Activities of the White Shirt Society and KLO (1945–1953)], *Kukka Chongbo Yongu* (Journal of National Intelligence Studies), 3:1 (2010): 47–82. Elsewhere in the Far East in those years, the US Army was gathering intelligence via veterans of the defunct Imperial Japanese Army and Navy. See Michael Petersen, "The Intelligence That Wasn't: CIA Name Files, the U.S. Army, and Intelligence Gathering in Occupied Japan" in Edward Drea et al., *Researching Japanese War Crimes: Introductory Essays* (Washington, DC: Nazi War Crimes and Japanese Imperial Government Records Interagency Working Group, 2006).

4. One US Army historian described the problem as one of Tokyo intelligence officers who "had heard 'wolf' cried too many times" before Pyongyang's surprise invasion of 25 June 1950. See John P. Finnegan, "The Evolution of US Army HUMINT: Intelligence Operations in the Korean War," *Studies in Intelligence*, 55 No. 2 (June 2011), https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol.-55-no.-2/index.html.

5. Detailed accounts of Inchon intelligence accounts come as well from Yon Jong, a Korean who had served in the Second World War in Japan's Kwantung Army before finding his way to Tokyo to work in G-2's Z Unit (commonly known as the Canon Agency, after commanding officer Lt. Col. Jack Canon). Yon, who settled in Tokyo after the Korean War, was behind General Willoughby's Japanese-language account, never published in English, of his intelligence service in occupied Japan, *GHQ Shirarezaru Chohosen* [GHQ Unknown Intelligence War] (Tokyo: Yamakawa Shuppansha, 2011, revised and expanded version of *Shirarezaru Nihon Senryo: Uirobi Kaikoroku* [Unknown Occupation of Japan: Willoughby Memoirs] Tokyo: Bancho Shobo, 1973). Yon also wrote an insider account of the Z Unit, with a foreword from Colonel Canon: *Kyanon Kikan kara no Shogen* [Testimony from the Canon Agency] (Tokyo: Bancho Shobo, 1973). Unlike Choe, Yon appears seemingly in every history, from Eugene Clark's own *The Secrets of Inchon* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 2002) to John Toland's *In Mortal Combat: Korea, 1950–1953* (New York: Morrow, 1991). Choe, for his part, described Yon as an amiable man of questionable loyalties, adept at insinuating himself into the trust of others.

6. US accounts of Inchon that I have seen omit reference to Choe, but Col. Kye in his own memoir, *Maegado Changgun kwa Kye In-ju Taeryong* [General MacArthur and Colonel Kye In-ju] (Seoul: Dain Media, 1997), recalls Choe at Palmi-do and credits him with finding the missing piece of equipment. Moreover, the book under review here includes a photograph of the letter of appreciation MacArthur wrote Choe in 1957 for sending him the "Inchon Flag."

7. Finnegan, 84.

Bloodmoney

David Ignatius. (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 2011), 372 pp.

Reviewed by Michael Bradford

In *Bloodmoney*, the latest David Ignatius espionage thriller, the author takes on a classic theme of the modern genre—the corrosive, hostile penetration of a spy agency and the reflexive, must-succeed hunt it generates. The scenario pits intelligence professionals' wits against a cunning infiltrator's determination to avoid detection. In this novel, the afflicted organization is the CIA—specifically, a Los Angeles-based commercial cover unit whose officers run a high-stakes political influence program targeting a single high-priority country. The unit, under the aegis of a tightly compartmented London front company, has operations officers engaging prominent Pakistani officials, business figures, and opinion makers. The secret relationships that are pitched are often accepted, leveraged by cash rewards for actions and influence aligned to US regional policy goals.

The unit's impressive results allow its chief, the politically ambitious Jeff Gertz, to advance a personal agenda, which includes the unit's functional independence and steady distancing from the oversight and control of CIA headquarters. When several of his operations officers are intercepted and killed en route to meetings with assets, Gertz faces the twin dangers of the unit's functional destruction and the end of his own career. He appoints Sophie Marx, an up-and-coming young officer, as his counterintelligence (CI) manager and tasks her with taking whatever steps are necessary to locate and terminate the penetration. Marx fully understands that Gertz prefers she operate under Langley's radar and that she might be risking her career by tackling the problem as an essentially unauthorized freelancer. She also knows that if she succeeds in salvaging the unit's future and her boss's ambitions, the benefit to her own career will be dramatic.

Marx begins the assignment without realizing that the security breach has sparked the interest of Cyril Hoffman, a wily Agency deputy director, who is suspicious of the LA unit's freewheeling operations and is no admirer of Gertz. Tracking Marx's progress from a distance, Hoffman may at any time insert himself into the case. In this way, Ignatius has set the table for an entertaining, if unexceptional, voyage as Marx crosses multiple time zones following leads, interrogating suspects, and raising and dismissing theories to explain the deadly intrusion, all the while hoping to avoid the rivalry-driven pitfalls posed by Gertz and Hoffman.

Despite the thinly drawn characters, the conventional pacing, and an awkwardly telegraphed, violent conclusion, *Bloodmoney* is nonetheless a valuable and recommended read: the hidden threat originates in South Asia, and Ignatius includes two characters native to that area who, in their failure to understand America and its intentions, and even to understand each other, effectively personify that troubled region's endless capacity to engender crippling suspicions, trustless partnerships, and unavoidable tragedy. The Pakistani intelligence chief, Lieutenant General Mohammed Malik, is the quintessential Punjabi technocrat. He is brilliant, ruthless, and firmly fixed atop his country's most powerful institution. Malik's instincts tell him Pakistani hierarchies are being influenced and corrupted by a new, hidden catalyst. He assumes it is American but

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cannot isolate it or its tactics. Despite believing Islamabad Station's claims of ignorance, Malik is convinced "Washington thinks it is acceptable to send secret warriors with bribes into the territory of an ally." This new challenge to Pakistan's integrity heightens Malik's decades-long frustration with his country's linkage to the western superpower: "They [the Americans] were on all sides of every deal they made; they were the gambler at the table, and they owned the casino. Even when they thought you understood what they were doing, you couldn't be sure, because they didn't know themselves."

Malik's suspicions lead him to the bordering Tribal Agencies, where the native Pathans' ruling codex of prescribed acts of honor and vengeance leave him as confused by their motivations and actions as he is by those of the Americans. These ingrained rules of obligation determine the actions of Dr. Omar al-Wazir, a world-class computer specialist whose formative training took place in the United States and who "had multiple binary identities, it could be said. He was a Pakistani but also, in some sense, a man tied to the West. He was a Pushtun from the raw tribal area of South Waziristan, but he was also a modern man. He was a secular scientist and also a Muslim, if not quite a believer. His loyalties might indeed have been confused before the events of nearly two years ago, but not now." Those events lead to the twin mysteries being desperately chased down by Marx and Malik, whose crossed paths and uneasy cooperation presage a final scene in which several characters lose everything. Readers can judge whether the survivors have won anything at all.

Ignatius has travelled throughout South Asia, including South Waziristan, and his renderings of locale and atmosphere are convincing. More importantly, his journalist's eye took a deeply focused reading of the people he met. Malik and al-Wazir, compelling characters, speak to the quality of the author's power of observation. Ignatius's impressive knowledge of US intelligence agencies and their workings is apparent in his syndicated columns, so artistic license can be granted here for his having the Los Angeles unit functioning as a nearly off-the-books entity. Indeed, Ignatius is fully aware that all modern intelligence agencies have a Mohammed Malik or Cyril Hoffman on board, finely attuned to potential threats from without, or within, their services.

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Intelligence Officer's Bookshelf

Compiled and reviewed by Hayden Peake

Current Topics

***Abuse of Power: How Cold War Surveillance and Secrecy Policy Shaped the Response to 9/11**, by Athan G. Theoharis.*

***Counterstrike: The Untold Story of America's Secret Campaign Against Al Qaeda**, by Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker.*

***International Intelligence Cooperation and Accountability**, by Hans Born, Ian Leigh, and Aidan Wills (eds.).*

***Keeping U.S. Intelligence Effective: The Need for a Revolution in Intelligence Affairs**, by William J. Lahneman.*

***The Next Wave: On the Hunt for Al Qaeda's American Recruits**, by Catherine Herridge, and **Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go To War In The Name of Islam**, by J. M. Berger.*

***Top Secret America: The Rise of the New American Security State**, by Dana Priest and William M. Arkin.*

General

***The CIA on Campus: Essays on Academic Freedom and the National Security State**, by Philip Zwerling (ed.).*

***Collaborative Intelligence: Using Teams to Solve Hard Problems**, by J. Richard Hackman.*

***Intelligence: The Secret World of Spies; An Anthology** (3rd edition), by Loch Johnson and James J. Wirtz (eds.).*

***Reducing Uncertainty: Intelligence Analysis and National Security**, by Thomas Fingar.*

***The Secret Book of CIA Humor**, by Ed Mickolus.*

***The Secrets of the FBI**, by Ronald Kessler.*

***Words of Intelligence: An Intelligence Professional's Lexicon for Domestic and Foreign Threats** (2nd edition), by Jan Goldman.*

Historical

***The Eleventh Day: The Full Story of 9/11 and Osama Bin Laden**, by Anthony Summers and Robbyn Swan.*

***Historical Dictionary of Atomic Espionage**, by Glenmore Trenear-Harvey.*

***The Horse That Leaps Through Clouds: A Tale of Espionage, the Silk Road and the Rise of Modern China**, by Eric Enno Tamm.*

***The Shah**, by Abbas Milani.*

Memoir

***The Black Banners: The Inside Story of 9/11 and the War Against al-Qaeda**, by Ali Soufan with Daniel Freedman.*

***The Craft We Chose: My Life in the CIA**, by Richard L. Holm.*

***The Interrogator: An Education**, by Glenn Carle.*

Intelligence Abroad

***The Art of Betrayal: Life and Death in the British Secret Service**, by Gordon Corera.*

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Current Topics

Abuse of Power: How Cold War Surveillance and Secrecy Policy Shaped the Response to 9/11, by Athan G. Theoharis. (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 2011), 212 pp., endnotes, index.

Marquette University Professor Emeritus Athan Theoharis is an old-school historian and longtime FBI nemesis who writes that, like the Bureau, "I am sorely deficient in the use of computers; I do not have an e-mail address, and I still use a manual typewriter." (x) These Luddite limitations have not kept Theoharis from developing the unmatched Freedom of Information Act FOIA inquiry skills he has used to acquire and analyze thousands of FBI documents. The result has been a series of books, all critical of Bureau operations. *Abuse of Power* is the latest contribution.

In this book Theoharis begins by critiquing a May 2002 statement issued by Attorney General John Ashcroft on then-new guidelines intended "to change the culture of the FBI from that of a 'reactive' law enforcement agency to one that was 'proactive'…[putting] prevention above all else." (xi) Ashcroft got his history wrong, says Theoharis. The FBI had been proactive since 1936, when it was given "a secret oral directive" by President Roosevelt to prevent espionage, sabotage, and subversion. The thesis of Theoharis's work is that the Bureau abused its powers then and continues to do so today.

In the opening chapters Theoharis lists examples—from WW II through the Cold War—of illegal wiretapping, questionable surveillance practices, and techniques designed to prevent public disclosure of these methods. There follow two chapters on counterintelligence. The first reviews familiar cases and criticizes the Bureau's failure to discover some Soviet espionage operations and to take advantage of others that did come to its attention. The second chapter argues that the shortcomings were due in part to political considerations having to do with the nature of the subversive threat and the FBI's failure to recognize the espionage threat. The chapter then summarizes the Bureau's questionable surveillance of prominent political figures suspected of communist associations.

The final chapter deals with the consequences of ignoring the lessons of the Cold War. Here Theoharis extends earlier arguments linking the "indifference to history of FBI intelligence investigations" to the dangers of public acceptance of post-9/11 practices. (149) He goes on to contend that "the basic premise that FBI surveillance activities need not comply with legislative restrictions had also determined the secret rulings of 2001–2007 of senior" White House and Justice Department officials. (151) He provides examples which, in his judgment, suggest the "FBI (and military) monitoring of dissident political activities leaves unresolved whether the FBI, the CIA, and the NSA had once again resumed" their WW II and Cold War practices. (155) If so, he contends, these further abuses of power will "promote a culture of lawlessness." (165)

Abuse of Power is carefully documented to support Theoharis's position, and while alternative explanations are possible, he does not provide them. Nevertheless, this book is deserving of scholarly attention.

Counterstrike: The Untold Story of America's Secret Campaign Against Al Qaeda, by Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker. (New York: Times Books, 2011), 324 pp., endnotes, bibliography, index.

The doctrine of containment coupled with the strategy of nuclear deterrence worked to keep the Cold War cold. The former applied to threats from nation-states, the latter to the weapons that could have destroyed them. In the post-9/11 world, equally serious threats exist, but they

don't originate from nation-states. The amorphous al Qaeda and its affiliates hold no territory, and deciding whom to retaliate against and how—should a nuclear weapon explode in a Western city—raises new and difficult problems. *Counterstrike* examines a new form of deterrence suggested by Thomas Shelling, one of the creators of Cold War deterrence theory. The new deterrence strategy would allow capture-and-kill missions while policies are created to deny terrorists certainty of success. It would also include efforts to disrupt fund-raising and recruitment and planning networks, and to "dissuade those who may support extremist ideology but who would not want to sacrifice their own lives to the cause." And finally, the deterrence strategy would include means to prevent attacks with weapons of mass destruction. (5) What needs to be done to implement this revision of the deterrence doctrine?

New York Times journalists Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker answer this question by first examining the disarray within the US government—with emphasis on the intelligence agencies—prior to 9/11. They describe how agencies gradually rose to the occasion and built a more integrated effort to combat religious extremists during the succeeding decade. The authors give special attention to several relatively unknown players, for example, Juan Zarate in the Treasury Department, who developed methods for tracking terrorist financing, and Pentagon policy planner Barry Pavel and his graduate-student associate, Matt Kroenig, who developed new methods—that some thought radical—for deterring terrorist networks, based on the assumption that individual terrorists can in fact be deterred. (51) It was an approach eventually adopted by the US military.

Schmitt and Shanker devote considerable attention to the need to better understand the terrorist enemy and how intelligence might help. They detail the problems of countering al Qaeda propaganda, the difficulty of collecting intelligence while preserving civil liberties, the risks presented by cyberwarfare capabilities, the political issues surrounding nations involved in combating terrorists and those who support them, and the challenges of dealing with homegrown terrorists. Interwoven in the discussion of these subjects are stories of turf battles among new security agencies, as well as other political conflicts that have complicated progress.

The authors do not argue that all the new approaches have been successful but claim that they demonstrate substantial progress. The operation in May 2011 that killed Osama bin Laden is one example. They suggest, for example, that the Abbottabad raid could not have succeeded had the pre-9/11 disarray not been overcome. "The extraordinary coming together, particularly of the CIA and the military…is unique in anybody's history," said Bob Gates. (259)

Counterstrike ends with a sobering warning: "You can destroy the people in al Qaeda…but you can't destroy the idea of al Qaeda…the attack is coming. The most important thing the nation can do is to be resilient." (273-76) The authors cite DIA analyst John Tyson (pseudonym), who noted that terrorism "is not something we can defeat…it's going to have to defeat itself." (278) This is an important book that puts the current terrorism threat in a real-world perspective.

International Intelligence Cooperation and Accountability, by Hans Born, Ian Leigh and Aidan Wills (eds.). (New York: Routledge, 2011), 335 pp., end-of-chapter notes, bibliography, index.

In 2008, the Norwegian Parliamentary Intelligence Oversight Committee hosted a workshop on accountability in international intelligence cooperation in the post-9/11 world. This volume contains 12 conference presentations by academics, lawyers, and parliamentary participants from various European and Asian nations and Canada. For readers unfamiliar with the subject, the two introductory chapters will be of considerable value. The first looks at how intelligence accountability and cooperation have grown in prominence since 9/11, the oversight mechanisms that resulted, and the legal and human rights issues that confront nations and

their intelligence services in dealing with terrorism. The second chapter discusses recent developments in international intelligence cooperation, with emphasis on the impact of globalization.

The next four chapters deal with financial sanctions and other coercive measures against individuals and organizations; the problems of collateral casualties and civil and human rights; the implications of rendition operations and the use of torture; and the role of peacekeeping operations, weapons inspections, and the apprehension and prosecution of war criminals. There follow three chapters focusing on oversight and review in the international and domestic arenas, and two chapters on centered on legal aspects. The concluding chapter, written by the editors, addresses the challenges posed by the sudden increase in intelligence cooperation since 9/11. While acknowledging that although the various solutions proposed in the presentations are imperfect, they nevertheless suggest options for improving cooperation through review and oversight bodies that stress legal frameworks for assuring accountability.

Although no US authors are included, various putative CIA operations and international reactions to them are offered as examples in the analyses of accountability issues. Thus the book is not light reading, but it is a valuable contribution on the issues raised and to the literature of intelligence.

Keeping U.S. Intelligence Effective: The Need for a Revolution in Intelligence Affairs, by William J. Lahneman. (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2011), 200 pp., end-of-chapter notes, bibliography, appendix, index.

Johannes Gutenberg's introduction of movable type ushered in a revolution in printing. Thomas Edison's invention of the electric light bulb revolutionized everyday living. William Lahneman, an assistant professor in political science at Towson State University in Maryland, is convinced that "US intelligence will decline" unless it undergoes a "Revolution in Intelligence Affairs (RIA)." And he asserts in his preface that "the emerging literature on this subject" supports this view. (xvii)[1]

Lahneman argues that before a revolution, "one set of rules defines the order of things. After a revolution, a different set of rules and processes prevails." (53) These rules are found in a "paradigm," or a way of doing things. An RIA requires a new paradigm for the Intelligence Community (IC) since it "has been over sixty years since the last paradigm shift" instituted by National Security Act of 1947; "the intelligence community still functions along the same lines today." Moreover, the changes required cannot be achieved using evolutionary or incremental improvements; "radical approaches" are necessary. (xx–xxvi)

These arguments are expanded in considerable detail in the book. In the key Chapter 4 ("Is A Revolution in Intelligence Affairs Needed?"), Lahneman argues in the affirmative since "developments in the intelligence enterprise" will change how intelligence is developed and used; require change in the structure of the IC; lead to a rise in new elites; and "significantly affect the national security of the country." Even if these assertions are true, Lahneman never makes clear why a revolution is needed to deal with them. Chapter 5 describes a "new intelligence paradigm" and compares it with current practices. In sum, "The 'new' IC would have two principal roles in the US intelligence enterprise: it would solve intelligence puzzles using the traditional paradigm and it would perform adaptive interpretations on issues that required classified, trusted, and open information," though the clandestine service would "remain relatively unchanged" by the RIA. Specifics are needed here too. (150–51)

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[1] For an early example, see William Nolte, "Keeping Pace with the Revolution in Military Affairs: Operation Iraqi Freedom and the Challenge to Intelligence," *Studies in Intelligence* 48, No. 1 (March 2004). This article is available on the CIA's website at https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol48no1/article01.html.

Lahneman's analysis may raise legitimate questions in the minds of current professional intelligence officers and others who have followed the evolution of US intelligence since 1947. For example, does the IC really function "along the same lines today" as its first constituent agencies did 60 years ago? How does that account for the introduction of computers, artificial intelligence, the Internet, satellites, cell phones, TV, new analytic techniques, increased congressional oversight, and substantial organizational changes? And if, as he writes in his conclusion, "the IC's traditional paradigm remains essential in today's world," (179) just what does the RIA involve that has not already been accomplished or contemplated?

Keeping U.S. Intelligence Effective does not make that distinction clear. In spite of Lahneman's initial assumptions, one cannot be faulted for concluding that he has made the case for well thought-out, focused, evolutionary change rather than radical change. The need for a revolution remains unproved.

The Next Wave: On the Hunt for Al Qaeda's American Recruits, by Catherine Herridge. (New York: Crown Forum, 2011), 258 pp., endnotes, photos, index.

Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go to War in the Name of Islam, by J. M. Berger. (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2011), 264 pp., endnotes, bibliography, index.

Both of these books discuss, from very different perspectives, the specter of US citizens becoming followers of al Qaeda and performing acts of terrorism against fellow Americans.

Fox News journalist Catherine Herridge describes the evolution of a dozen al Qaeda recruits, some arguably seeming to be like most Americans. The late Anwar al-Awlaki was perhaps the most disturbing of her examples. He became an effective "a virtual recruiter."(41) Herridge tells how he became radicalized while still managing to be invited to the Pentagon and the White House. She covers his distinctly non-Muslim personal behavior—he was arrested twice for soliciting prostitutes (117)—and his links to al-Shabaab, the underwear bomber, the Times Square bomber, and those involved in attempting to employ explosives-laden printer cassettes. She also deals with other terrorist support components—including schools; institutions such as the Institute of Islamic and Arabic Studies in America in Fairfax, Virginia; Internet publications and chat rooms; and charities—that help indoctrinate potential radicals and finance al Qaeda programs.

Herridge also looks at Congress and the Intelligence Community leadership as they deal with controversial issues, for example, whether captured terrorists should be treated as common criminals and tried in civilian courts. She evaluates the track record of government antiterrorism agencies, giving them mixed marks for efficiency and high marks for luck. Unlike many writers on this topic, Herridge identifies many of her sources.

In the midst of all the above, with a husband in Afghanistan, part of her own liver was transplanted in her son—both recovered. While in the recovery room, she tracked the continued tracking the latest terrorist events on her Blackberry. An admirable reporter.

The Next Wave offers no solution for the problems of homegrown terrorists, though it suggests that first hand observation of the unrepentant terrorists at Guantanamo might reduce over sympathetic reporting by those who refuse to face the current reality.

Freelance journalist J. M. Berger takes a broader view of the homegrown US al Qaeda terrorist in *Jihad Joe*. He starts by pointing out that modern Islamic terrorism began with the takeover of the Grand Mosque in Mecca in 1979. The group that took and held the mosque for two weeks included two Americans. Other Americans later fought for Islam against the Soviets in Afghanistan and against non-Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chechnya, Somalia, and Yemen—an unsettling chapter is devoted to them. (vii) One American was present in 1988 at

the creation of al Qaeda, when America became a jihadist target. (17) Berger has identified "more than 240 American-citizen jihadists," many of them native born. He defines jihadists as those who "travel abroad to fight in a foreign conflict specifically in the name of Islam" as well as those who support them. (x, xi)

In the support category, Berger describes a number of Islamic organizations whose officials and supporters—including Americans—were prosecuted for supporting al Qaeda. He also treats a number of individual cases. Of particular interest is Ali Abdelsaoud Mohamed, who was recruited by Ayman al Zawahiri. A talented linguist, Mohamed was sent to the United States and applied to the CIA but was rejected. He succeeded in joining the Army, where he trained Special Forces troops and managed to gain access to top secret documents before being caught. Not all the recruits were as successful, and Berger tells the stories of the underwear and Times Square bombers to prove it. But it is Anwar al Awlaki who gets the most detailed attention for his actions in the United States and Yemen.

Though little in *Jihad Joe* is new, the stories have not appeared in one place before. And they are well documented and supplemented by Berger's interviews. His chapter on al Qaeda propaganda before and after 9/11 is illuminating, as it demonstrates the impact of the Internet when used by skilled communicators to spread the jihadist gospel.

From time to time Berger points out US government excesses in dealing with Arab-American citizens, mostly right after 9/11. He concludes by warning that the only solution to the homegrown jihadist problem is creating conditions in which Islamic extremism cannot survive, while at the same time preserving constitutional and human rights of all citizens. Not an original idea, but the case is well made.

Top Secret America: The Rise of the New American Security State, by Dana Priest and William M. Arkin. (NewYork: Little, Brown and Company, 2011), 294 pp., bibliography, photos, index.

Top Secret America is a celebration, perhaps unintended, of open source information collection. Most of its data was obtained by direct observation of events, through interviews, and from the Internet. And it contains impressive charts and diagrams. The authors admit some information came from unidentified sources, who admitted "they were breaking some internal agency rule." Readers are assured, however, that nothing was included that would damage national security. The authors conclude that the only source of alarm they reveal is "that one of the greatest secrets of Top Secret America is its disturbing dysfunction." (xxiv)

What then, is the message of this book? It does not discuss military intelligence operations, foreign intelligence collection, personal security issues, or counterintelligence operations. Rather, it focuses on national security organizations, the people involved, and the corporations contracted to support them. The central theme is that because there are too many of each and because they are too secret, more transparency is needed to reduce costs and improve results.

The authors supply numbers to support their judgments. For example, they estimate that at one point "854,000 people held top secret clearances." They are spread out among an excessive number of government agencies—described in chapter 5—and supported by more than 2,000 corporations supplying "legions of private contractors hired after 9/11 to do the work once handled by federal employees." Leaving aside the argument that the more likely reason for hiring contractors was to perform work existing staffs were unable to handle because of unexpected demands after 9/11, these are indeed large numbers. But are these organizations just the source "of prosperity for life" as the authors claim, or is there a legitimate reason for granting all these clearances? (158) *Top Secret America* does not address this issue.

Nor do the authors recognize that the number of clearances is not really the point. It is the

number of people with access to classified data that counts. The total includes thousands of support staff with no need for such access. The authors include anecdotes from high-level government employees that suggest the numbers are too large and that the volume of intelligence generated by those workers is often overwhelming, but they do not offer a method for determining what the proper figures should be or what actions are needed to deal with the mass of data.

Chapter 11 describes the Joint Special Operation Command (JSOC), an organization that deals with what the authors term the "dark matter" that helps "the CIA's paramilitary Special Activities Division" and other agencies carry out special counterterrorist missions in foreign countries. After describing some successes and failures, the chapter concludes that JSOC has "arrived in force to take on the slow metabolism of Top Secret America's obese body, to infiltrate command and control centers, to push its leaders to make decisions that use JSOC's unique skills, and to be ready to pounce anywhere in the world once they do." (255) The reader is left wondering just what this means for national security.

Top Secret America screams that the intelligence establishment is too big and that many agree. But that argument was part of the public discussion long before Priest and Arkin wrote this book. The numbers they present may be new to some, but the for those familiar with government, size, personnel selection criteria, and who should answer decide are perennial and unanswered questions. Solutions in specific cases where downsizing is shown to be necessary would helpful. But examples have eluded the authors, and readers are left with a colorful conception of an oft-mentioned problem without any way of judging how serious it is. Not very helpful.

General

The CIA on Campus: Essays on Academic Freedom and the National Security State, by Philip Zwerling (ed.). (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 254 pp., 2011), end-of-chapter notes, index.

University of Texas–Pan American Assistant Professor and former Unitarian Minister Philip Zwerling asserts that his "goal of creating and enlarging knowledge in a search for truth depends on openness, sharing information and data, and collaboration across disciplines." (2) He views the CIA as incompatible with these ends and writes, generally without documentation, that "CIA projects on campus involve recruitment…curriculum modification…[and] have drawn faculty and students into dangerous mind control experiments, election fraud and the training of police torturers and military death squads. Such projects always involve secrecy and subversion of independent faculty." (3) *The CIA on Campus* consists of nine articles that reflect Zwerling's position. Two are his, one is by a former CIA officer, and the rest are by academics with expertise in anthropology, English, history, library science, and psychology.

The material is not new, and the authors' interpretations of their data are dubious. For example, a typical view is that "those who wish to bring the CIA on campus must confront [a] history of lawlessness, interference with free academic inquiry, and spying that will destroy the academic settings the CIA seeks to join." (56) The CIA is not the only intelligence agency subject to Zwerling's scrutiny. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Department of Homeland Security, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the National Security Agency are not ignored. (102)

At times the authors digress from their central topic. Zwerling, for example raises three rhetorical questions that have nothing to do with the CIA on campus, although they reveal his biases: "How do you run a secret intelligence service in an open democracy? How do you serve the truth

by lying? How do you spread democracy by deceit?" "History reveals the answer," writes Zwerling, "You don't." That there are other legitimate interpretations of intelligence history is not evident in *The CIA on Campus.*

Collaborative Intelligence: Using Teams to Solve Hard Problems, by J. Richard Hackman. (San Francisco, CA: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, 2011), 220 pp., endnotes, bibliography, index.

Some four years ago, J. Richard Hackman, Harvard professor of Social and Organizational Psychology, was conducting research on "how best to design and lead the diversity of teams that operate within the US Intelligence Community." (ix) The methodology required observing IC teams at work, and while the results were found to be applicable t? teams in general—sports, flight crews, musical ensembles—the focus of this book is on intelligence.

The first part of this three-part study lays out the Hackman's approach, which is to examine how teams are designed, staffed, and led, with an emphasis on the behavior of people. He cites studies that recognize what many intelligence officers know from experience: "analytic failure stems from dysfunctional behaviors and practices within individual agencies and is are not likely to be remedied by structural changes in organization."[2] (4) Hackman goes on to consider what makes a great team while acknowledging that in some cases solo performers are more suited for certain jobs. Then he looks at conditions that require teams and those that do not. Finally, he deals with what "effectiveness" means and how it can be assessed.

In the second part, the backbone of the book, Hackman defines "six enabling conditions that together create a team-friendly work environment" and promote team effectiveness. Here he examines in detail the attributes of a successful team, its motivation and purpose, the desirable characteristics of team members, the preferred norms of member conduct, the support structures that enable successful outcomes, and the role of "competent and well-timed team coaching" to minimize difficulties while enhancing chances of client satisfaction. (51-52) He provides many illustrations of pitfalls and suggests solutions.

The first of two chapters in the final part of the book looks at the importance of team leadership when leaders are acquainted in advance with the six enabling conditions. The data for this topic comes from a study of 64 teams in six intelligence agencies. A key result is Hackman's 60-30-10 rule. Sixty percent of a team's effectiveness is determined by "the prework the team leader does. Thirty percent is determined by how well the initial launch of the team goes. Only 10 percent is determined by what the leader does after the team is already working." (154-55) The best team leaders actively encourage leadership contributions from the members. (165)

In the final chapter, Hackman looks at team context, or the managerial environment in which a team works. He warns against reactive management and the tendency to apply incremental fixes, for example, to please Congress. Such steps might involve replacing a valuable team member, adding an expert who doesn't fit, or reorganizing when a more thoughtful approach would bring better results without destroying a valuable team.

Those considering careers in intelligence, those recently employed in the profession, and seasoned professionals will find *Collaborative Intelligence* a well documented, very valuable source of proven concepts.

[2] J. R. Cooper, *Curing Analytic Pathologies: Pathways to Improved Intelligence Analysis* (Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2008). This is available on the CIA's website at https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/curing-analytic-pathologies-pathways-to-improved-intelligence-analysis-1/index.html.

Intelligence: The Secret World of Spies; An Anthology (3rd edition), by Loch Johnson and James J. Wirtz (eds.). (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 564 pp., end-of-chapter notes, bibliography, index.

Any collection of articles on intelligence written by experts can be a real help to teachers and those seeking to expand their knowledge of the profession. The third edition of *Intelligence: The Secret World of Spies*—the first two had slightly different titles—is a positive contribution to this genre. Its 10 parts cover the basic intelligence topics—collection, analysis, dissemination, covert action, and counterintelligence—and add several more that have an important bearing on modern intelligence agencies. These include: the role of the policymaker, accountability, politicization, post-9/11 intelligence, and select views on intelligence in other nations.

Twenty-four of this edition's 39 articles are new. The collection includes material written by people with direct experience in the profession. Among them are serving and former intelligence officers, congressmen, and academics; some qualify in more than one category. The work also includes several extracts from the reports of government commissions and professional journals. These may not be original, but they are not readily available elsewhere. There are two contributions from the UK, as well as one by KGB defector Alexander Orlov.

All in this collection are worth reading, but since viewpoints on some issues conflict, readers must decide which are most valid. Each article is deserving of a brief comment here, but space precludes that option. Worth noting here, however, are a few that address topics not often included in such compendiums, or which offer especially telling observations. In the first category, Paul Redmond offers some important insights on counterintelligence. Stan Taylor and Daniel Snow consider what motivates spies and how they get caught, and former DCI Stansfield Turner looks at intelligence in the George W. Bush administration. CIA lawyer Fred Manget scrutinizes judicial accountability, and coeditor Wirtz addresses deception in the information age.

In the latter category, Arthur Hulnick presents interesting views on the traditional intelligence cycle, and Paul Pillar contributes firsthand comments on intelligence and policy before the Iraq War 2003. Senior analyst Jack Davis has two contributions which convey his years of experience.

Intelligence: The Secret World of Spies is a very worthwhile contribution, well documented and well written.

Reducing Uncertainty: Intelligence Analysis and National Security, by Thomas Fingar. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011), 176 pp., endnotes, index.

Stanford professor Thomas Fingar has captured the essence of the intelligence analyst's function in the title of this book. The challenge, Fingar elaborates, is how to reduce uncertainty in light of "the changes that have transformed the scope, content, and time lines of intelligence analysis during the past two decades, and more importantly, to enumerate and explicate the enduring requisites for the production of accurate, insightful, and useful analytic judgments." (7)

Fingar is uniquely qualified to address these issues. After completing his formal education at Cornell and Stanford Universities, he began his intelligence career as a linguist and military analyst. His last intelligence position was deputy director of national intelligence for analysis. In between, he spent 14 years with the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research and was chairman of the National Intelligence Council in 2005.

Reducing Uncertainty does not deal with analytical models and procedures. Instead, Fingar provides an overall view that compares the conditions of Cold War nation-state analysis with those of today's, in which dynamic situations often involve nonstate actors. Fingar ponders "the

constraints, challenges and opportunities" today's analysts are likely to confront in their careers, illustrating his points with anecdotes from his own experience. He includes a chapter entitled "Myths, Fears and Expectations," which challenges popular views of intelligence analysis found in spy novels. The simplistic notion that an analyst needs only to "connect the dots" ignores the level of effort involved in evaluating, assessing, interpreting, explaining, and validating data collected from a multitude of sources—i.e., knowing which dots to connect. With regard to expectations, he stresses at several points that analysts are not "supposed to advocate specific courses of action," (25) although he admits he did so when pressed by then Secretary of State Albright. (45–46)

Recognizing that a primary purpose of analysis is to reduce the risk of surprise by providing insight, he points out that this is not always easy. Policymakers sometimes demand raw data so they can do their own analysis but don't realize how much data that must be considered—IMINT, SIGINT, OSINT, etc. Fingar uses examples from the President's Daily Briefing and National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) to show the value of finished over raw intelligence.

After chapters discussing elements of strategic and estimative analysis, Fingar details two cases of what happens when things go wrong. The first concerns "the error-plagued 2002 NIE on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction program" and the steps taken to prevent a recurrence of the mistakes that were made. The second deals with the 2007 NIE on the status of Iran's nuclear program and illustrates how important conclusions can be misconstrued when authors incorrectly assume the Estimate will remain classified.

Reducing Uncertainty is a good overview of what analysts strive for, the problems they are likely to encounter, and the actions necessary to achieve their analytical goals. Fingar calls the process changes needed to meet the demands of the post-9/11 world "analytic transformation." It is a mix of bottom-up changes initiated by analysts and top-down policies implemented by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). Ironically, Fingar originally opposed creation of the ODNI, but he is now convinced it was "absolutely essential." (138) His is a valuable book, one that puts the analyst's role in perspective.

The Secret Book of CIA Humor, by Ed Mickolus. (Gretna, LA: Pelican Publishing Company, 2011), 237 pp., bibliography, no index.

In an earlier life, Ed Mickolus was a standup comic, and throughout his career in the CIA he was conscious of the humorous events that occurred in the course of day-to-day duties. *The Secret Book of CIA Humor* puts many of them on record. Perhaps the most famous involves the new employee who begins a career at CIA Headquarters doing routine, if not menial jobs, like disposing of classified waste after it is placed in specially marked burn bags. The rookie is tasked with carrying the bag to the burn chute, shouting his badge number down the open chute to alert those below that it is coming, and waiting for confirmation of receipt after the bag is sent down. It is a long wait. Few ever admit to having performed this operation. There are a number of ingenious variations to this practical joke, and Mickolus notes several of them. Then there is the one about the administrator who grew tired of the standard distribution restriction placed on documents. Instead of "For Internal Use Only," he chose "For Infernal Use Only." (93) Other intelligence services get a share of attention too, as in the story (sometimes attributed to Russian sources) in which the CIA, FBI, and KGB are challenged to find a rabbit. Their differing approaches presumably speak to the ethos of each organization. (119) An example of how analysts deal with popular fiction is the now legendary spoof, at least in CIA, in which the "real CIA" dealt with the events in Tom Clancy's *Hunt for Red October*. Mickolus devotes a chapter to that one.

A number of humorous quotes are attributed to former directors. Robert Gates is quoted as commenting that "The analysis came down firmly on both sides of the issue." (105) John

Deutch tells about the time his deputy, George Tenet, cleared a conference room during a meeting with foreign dignitaries. When only he and the director remained, Tenet told him, "your fly is open." (105) There is also a chapter with quotes from performance appraisals. A few examples: "this officer cannot be underrated" (195); "She has become a multitalented, odd-job man;" (197) and "He is endowed with a certain lethal gentleness." (200)

There is more—a lot more—in *The Secret Book of CIA Humor.* All of it will provoke at least a smile, but none of it is secret.

The Secrets of the FBI, by Ronald Kessler. (New York: Crown Publishers, 2011), 296 pp., photos, index.

In 2002, investigative journalist Ronald Kessler published *The Bureau: The Secret History of the FBI,* a book that looked at the FBI from its beginnings to the early days of Director Robert Mueller's tenure. The present work covers some of the same ground but focuses on elements of the Bureau not previously revealed publicly. Perhaps the most interesting are tales about the Tactical Operations Unit, which performs legal, state-of-the-art break-ins. These sometimes go awry despite excruciatingly detailed planning, which has to include imaginative escape scenarios. It is surprising that Kessler was given access to this never-before-mentioned activity.

Some stories have appeared before. These include Hoover's secret files, the Watergate break-in, and the mole in the CIA—Karl Koecher—about whom Kessler devoted nearly an entire book.[3] The Robert Hanssen case covers three chapters, with some new details, the most significant of which is the admission by the FBI agent in charge of the case that he got it wrong when he focused on Brian Kelley of the CIA as the principal suspect. More recent topics include the FBI's response to 9/11, the Soviet illegals case, the underwear bomber, handling of terrorists caught in the United States, the problems of the computer case management system—Mueller's biggest failure (284)—and cybercrime.

Not all the tales are about national security or counterintelligence. Kessler includes passages about congressional misbehavior and a chapter concerning a former director's wife. The description of the Bureau's training center, however, is instructive.

There are no source notes in *Secrets of the FBI*. Kessler relies on interviews, mostly of FBI special agents and Director Mueller. The writing is brisk and his tone occasionally gossipy, but Kessler is easy to read. Overall, one gets a good picture of the scope and magnitude of the varied and difficult jobs performed by the Bureau. It is an interesting book.

Words of Intelligence: An Intelligence Professional's Lexicon for Domestic and Foreign Threats (2nd edition), by Jan Goldman. (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2011), 298 pp., end-of-chapter notes, bibliography, topical index.

This work is much improved over the first edition, although the unforgivable inclusion of the term "defector-in-place" does not even mention that for oxymoronic reasons it is no longer common usage. A less severe boo-boo is equating the term "asset" with "agent." Most of the entries have obvious application to the intelligence profession. But some are questionable: "wounded in action" and "Cassandra" are examples. Several terms are omitted, most notably the CIA Publications Review Board and its equivalent in agencies outside the CIA. In the same category, the often controversial term "contractor" was nowhere to be found. Occasionally an entry's definition comes as a shock. "Chamber" is an example; it is defined as a "large excavation," when some in the profession might reasonably have expected a reference to codebreaking. An-

[3] Ronald Kessler, *Spy vs. Spy: Stalking Soviet Spies in America* (New York: Scribner's, 1988).

other category worthy of attention in the future is terminology that has different meanings in US and British lexicons; "assessment" is an example. Readers should be cautioned not to accept these definitions as final, although they are reasonable points of departure.

Historical

The Eleventh Day: The Full Story of 9/11 and Osama Bin Laden, by Anthony Summers and Robbyn Swan. (New York: Ballantine Books, 2011), 603 pp., endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

How could it have happened? The answer has been sought since 9/11. Journalists Anthony Summers and Robbyn Swan spent a decade assembling and analyzing the mass of often conflicting public documentation. Their result is a story containing a maddening mix of turf battles, gaps in data, misinterpretations, conspiracy theories, incompetence, and solid fact.

The Eleventh Day is structured chronologically in seven parts. Part 1 surveys the attacks on 9/11 from the perspectives of those most immediately involved: terrorists, flight crews, air traffic controllers, passengers, first responders, victims on the ground, government workers, and the president. Part 2 examines the conspiracy theories that quickly arose to explain what happened: the collapse of "the Twin Towers was in reality caused by explosives planted in the building;" (94) There were no suicide pilots on those September 11 jets;" (95) and "The idea that the Pentagon had been struck by a Boeing airliner on 9/11…was nonsense, a loony tale," to mention only three. (97) The authors present considerable evidence to show these theories are wrong. Part 3 looks at how America responded: the reaction against Arabs; the US intelligence agencies' claims and recriminations over who did what and when; and the beginning of the hunt for Bin Ladin. Parts 4 and 5 describe in great depth the roles of those who plotted the attacks and those who carried them out. The short, six-page Part 6 deals with a series of events on 10 September that occurred—or should have occurred—and their actual and potential influence on the attacks: crucial messages were ignored or not understood; President Putin that warned that "they are getting ready to act;" (358) terrorist movements were ignored; and the government was in some instances complacent.

The final part—73 pages—addresses "Unanswered Questions." The authors discuss "multiple and serious questions and yawning gaps in our knowledge, of which the public knows little or nothing." (365) For example, they discuss the assertion—ignored by the 9/11 Commission, they point out—that "US intelligence officials had a face-to-face meeting with Osama bin Laden in early July 2001." (366) Then comes a journalistic favorite, the question of when the CIA gave its intelligence about two of the hijackers to the FBI. (375) The authors also raise questions about what foreign intelligence services had links with al Qaeda. Finally, they comment on conflicting statements issued following the death of Bin Ladin. They even address the discord surrounding a mosque planned near Ground Zero. The questions raised may be of historical interest, but the only short-term conclusion they invite is that there will be more books on 9/11.

The Eleventh Day gives a good summary of what is known and not known about 9/11, although it is a bit too conspiracy oriented. It also makes clear that coordinated intelligence at all levels is a vital element in international security. In general, it is a valuable effort.

Historical Dictionary of Atomic Espionage, by Glenmore Trenear-Harvey. (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2011), 242 pp., bibliography, chronology, appendices, no index.

British intelligence analyst Glenmore Trenear-Harvey has written a useful compendium of espionage personalities and events associated with nuclear weapons from the 1930s to the present. In general, the entries provide summaries of activities of most of the key players and major cases. One omission is the case of Engelbert Broda, who spied for the Soviets while in England during the WW II. For reasons not explained, this dictionary does not include references, such as were found in earlier contributions to this series. And while there are fewer errors than in previous *Historical Dictionaries*, fact-checking remains an editorial problem that might be solved by an insistence on footnotes. For example, Elizabeth Bentley did not provide her detailed statement in September 1945 (23); that occurred in November of that year. Morton Sobell was not released from Alcatraz Prison; he was released from a prison in Lewisburg, Pennsylvania.[4] The first U-2 overflight of the Soviet Union took place in 1956, not 1955. (xiv) Finally, Lavrentiy Beria was made chairman of the Soviet atomic weapons program in 1944, not 1940.[5]

Still and overall, the *Historical Dictionary of Atomic Espionage* is a good place to start for those studying atomic espionage.

The Horse That Leaps Through Clouds: A Tale of Espionage, the Silk Road and the Rise of Modern China, by Eric Enno Tamm. (Berkeley, CA: Counterpoint, 2011), 496 pp., endnotes, bibliography, maps, index.

Carl Gustaf Mannerheim was born in Finland when it was a Russian province. He began his government service as a junior officer in the Imperial Russian Army and ended it as a marshal and the sixth president of independent Finland (1944–46). A major event in the middle of his career occurred in 1906, just after he had returned from Russia's surprising defeat in the Russo-Japanese war. The Imperial Russian Army did not want to be surprised again. Then Colonel Mannerheim was tasked to undertake a secret, overland mission to China to assess its warmaking capability, while making similar judgments about the other countries encountered en route. Traveling undercover as a member of a scientific society, Mannerheim took two years to complete the trip. He wrote a detailed report of his findings that was eventually published as a book.[6] After reading the book, author Eric Tamm decided to make the same trip, retracing, as nearly as possible, the original route. *The Horse That Leaps Through Clouds* tells both his and Mannerheim's stories.

Tamm's narrative approach is to alternate quotes from Mannerheim's report about a topic or area with his own observations. Obtaining a Chinese visa or travel permit is one example. The process requires the phonetic transliteration of a Western name into Chinese characters, syllable by syllable. Thus Mannerheim became "the horse that leaps through clouds," a much admired image in China. (156–57)

Along the way, Mannerheim and his assistants encountered French spies, who wanted to learn what he was doing as he travelled through the "stans" of Eurasia, China itself, and Tibet, where he met the Dalai Lama—even then a sensitive issue with the government of China. He was at all times closely observed by local security elements. Tamm set out alone, but locals attached themselves along the way, some helpful, some not. He was arrested twice. He, too, confronted local security elements except, curiously, in Afghanistan.

[4] See Morton Sobell, *On Doing Time* (San Francisco: Golden Gate National Parks Association, 2001), 411.
[5] See David Holloway, *Stalin and The Bomb* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), 129.
[6] C. G. Mannerheim, *Across Asia: From West to East in 1906-1908, 2 vols.* (Oosterhout, N.B., The Netherlands: Anthropological Publications, 1940).

Tamm adds biographical detail about Mannerheim's early life and his role in WW II. But the basic lessons the book teaches are the difficulties of operating undercover in a hostile environment and the value of firsthand observation when one wants to learn about a country. A side benefit is the look at local cultures and attitudes toward the West that remain unchanged from Mannerheim's day.

The Horse That Leaps Through Clouds is a well-told, thoroughly documented, and fascinating story that illustrates the many changes that have occurred along the Silk Road since the early 20th century and how much has remained the same.

The Shah, by Abbas Milani. (New York: Palgrave, Macmillan, 2011), 488 pp., endnotes, index.

The name "Iran" has been used by that country's inhabitants since the days of the Sassanian empire (224–651BC). The Greeks called it Persia, the name used by Western states until 1935, when the then king, Reza Shah Pahlavi, asked that they use "Iran." The king had had himself crowned 10 years earlier, in 1925. The ostentatious ceremony included an entourage of military and political supporters led by his six-year-old son, Crown Prince Mohammad Reza. On that day "the leisurely pace of life of Mohammad Reza…came to an end." (34) In *The Shah*, Iranian-born Stanford University Professor Abbas Milani provides an elegantly written biography of the man who became the second shah of Iran and a look at his impact, which persists to this day.

This is not the first biography of the Mohammad Reza, but it is the first written without court "guidance" or by a detractor. Milani gives an unadorned account of a young man, "homeschooled with tutors," who was sent to Switzerland, where he learned French and was exposed to "European aristocratic affluence." (42) Other biographers have written that this "was an extraordinarily unhappy period for the Crown Prince." (51) Milani disagrees, and so did Mohammad Reza's sister, who would write that the crown prince was happy in the European environment, impressed "by the democratic attitudes he had seen at school" and "how he had come to realize for the first time how much economic and social disparity there was among the Iranian people of Iran." (52)

Mohammad Reza returned to Iran in 1936. While gradually becoming involved in the political issues of the day, he found time to marry an Egyptian in Cairo. He returned with his bride in November 1939. By this time the war in Europe had started, and the political situation in Iran was challenged by the Germans and their new allies, the Soviets. Iran tried to appease the Nazis and watched the Soviets closely—at one point, 12 Iranian officers were charged "with espionage on behalf of the Soviet Union." The British and Americans were also in the mix, vying for oil rights and for opposing gestures to the Nazis. The Germans had sent "advisors," and while the shah vacillated with regard to German presence, conspiracies abounded. (65–68) By August 1941, Britain and its new ally, the Soviet Union, deemed inadequate the first shah's attempts to deal with the German threat in the oil fields, and the Brits invaded Iran. The ultimate consequence of the turmoil that followed was the shah's abdication and the reluctant assumption of power by his son.

For the next decade, the young shah endured "a baptism by fire." (89) He survived an attempt on his life; attempted to reconcile with the clergy, whose role his father has tried to limit; and dealt with economic problems that caused riots and political controversies. Those controversies were aggravated by the British and the Soviets, who attempted to influence the young shah's appointments. His precarious grasp on power during the early 1940s was evident when he hosted the 1943 Tehran Conference, where, he later wrote, "the Big Three paid me little notice." (111) His problems with the secular nationalist politician Mohammed Mossadeq began in 1944, when the latter pushed through a bill prohibiting any new oil concessions during the war. As the shah dealt with his political problems, his marriage ended in divorce in 1947. Then there was the challenge of dealing with the insurgent

Tudeh Party, which was sponsored by the Soviet Union. The shah's fight against communism did not end when the Soviets left Iran under pressure from President Truman in 1952. By then the shah was struggling to break the British oil monopoly while countering newly elected Prime Minister Mossadeq's attempts to nationalize the industry. This led to the shah's temporary abdication and the now famous Operation AJAX—the CIA name; the British called it BOOT—to oust Mossadeq and restore the shah to the throne.

Milani's treatment of AJAX/BOOT covers familiar ground, with two exceptions. The first is his aversion to Kermit Roosevelt, the CIA officer heading up AJAX. Milani casts him as "having a tendency toward self-adulating exaggeration." As evidence, he points out first that Roosevelt's memoir claimed "he had picked Kim Philby as a double-agent when he first saw him."[7] Then he mentions Roosevelt's use of political connections in Iran for personal gain. (177) The second exception is his position on the CIA role in the 1953 coup. He does not doubt that the British and American operatives planned "a series of events." He just questions whether they were decisive: "there is still some ambiguity about what actually sealed Mossadeq's fate on August 19." (172, 186)

Milani depicts the final 15 years of the shah's reign as a mix of political maneuvering—foreign and domestic—and autocratic modernization, which included the troubled, though extravagant, private life of an insecure king who had come to believe he had a divine right to rule. Domestic security was beefed up by the intelligence service SAVAK, and Milani presents cases of ferreting out moles in fascinating detail. He covers the shah's relationships with several US presidents and touches on his overtures to the Soviet Union, which disturbed Washington. In the end, the shah's attempts to develop a nuclear program, battle Islamic extremism, do business with Iraq, and subordinate human rights to the needs of the state brought about another revolution that forced him to flee forever.

Milani's biography includes new material from both Western and Iranian archives. He shows that there was indeed a basis for the shah's chronic distrust of those with whom he was forced to do business, and that his methods of dealing with his opposition led to his demise. *The Shah* is a fair treatment of a complex man ill-suited for his role in life. Perhaps the book's most important contribution is the background it provides to explain why Iran's history is still influencing present-day events.

Memoir

The Black Banners: The Inside Story of 9/11 and the War Against al-Qaeda, by Ali Soufan with Daniel Freedman. (New York: W. W. Norton, 2011), 572 pp., no index.

An Islamic hadith (a statement or act attributed to the Prophet Muhammad) mentions undefeatable warriors from the Khursan region carrying black banners at "the Islamic version of Armageddon."[8] They symbolize the fanatical religious element of radical jihadist ideology. Osama bin Laden signed his declaration of jihad in Khursan; al Qaeda banners are black. (xvii) For author Ali Soufan, they are warning flags to the West. His book explains why.

After spending his teenage years in Lebanon during its civil war, Ali Soufan moved to the United States and attended Mansfield College

[7] This paraphrase of what Roosevelt wrote is accurate. But Milani could have added that Roosevelt also claimed his suspicions were due to Guy Burgess's appalling behavior, unlikely since not even the British suspected Philby until after he defected. Then there was Roosevelt's implication that his early suspicions of Philby protected AJAX, but Philby had left MI6 by the time planning of AJAX had begun. See Kermit Roosevelt, *Countercoup: The Struggle for the Control of Iran* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), 109.
[8] Khursan historically is seen as Southwest Asia, including Afghanistan.

in Pennsylvania. As Soufan considered what to do after graduation, a mentor suggested the FBI. His fraternity brothers bet he wouldn't apply. Proving them wrong, he joined the Bureau in 1997 and left sometime after 2005. In between, he participated in several major investigations, including of the attack on the USS Cole in Yemen. But his primary role was as an interrogator. *Black Banners* focuses on this aspect of his career. His approach to interrogation excluded the use of enhanced techniques, a subject he comments on at length—he argues the techniques don't work and only make things worse. His interrogations took advantage of his fluency in Arabic and his detailed knowledge of Islam.

Black Banners also provides background on al Qaeda and the rationale behind the radical Islamic movement. Readers get a firsthand view of the thinking and motivations of the many terrorists he interrogated, some familiar, many not. But the book has limitations. There are no source notes, it contains many reconstructed conversations, pseudonyms are used in some cases, dates and places are often omitted, and a substantial amount of the narrative is blacked out. The redactions, including open-source testimony, were imposed by the CIA, and Soufan is very critical of the Agency's justifications.

If Soufan is sending a message beyond the difficulties encountered by FBI agents in dealing with terrorists and the fanatical zeal driving al Qaeda followers, it is that enhanced interrogation will not extract intelligence from detainees. This is a valuable book worth close attention.

The Craft We Chose: My Life in the CIA, by Richard L. Holm. (Mountain Lake Park, MD: Mountain Lake Press, 2011), 568 pp., photos, index.

In February 1965, 29-year-old Richard Holm arrived at Brook Army Hospital in San Antonio, Texas, in an unmarked plane. Burn surgeon Captain Timothy Miller was told Holm was a missionary who had suffered severe burns in Africa. Miller suspected there was more to the story, but he turned his attention to his patient, who could not see and could barely speak. His recovery would be long and difficult. Holm lost one eye and could barely see out of the other. Multiple painful surgeries followed. As Miller, now chief of Plastic Surgery at UCLA Medical School, observes in his foreword to this book, "you cannot avoid hurting a burn victim on a daily basis." Holm "dealt with the pain by making jokes." (11) A year later Holm was flown to Walter Reed Army Hospital, where he received a corneal transplant and finally saw Miller. By then, Miller had learned that his "missionary" patient had been injured in an airplane crash while on a CIA operation. *The Craft We Chose* tells that story and details other adventures from Holm's 35-year Agency career, which spanned 11 directors.

The first edition of Holm's memoir, *The American Agent*, was published in the United Kingdom in 2003.[9] This revised and expanded American edition adds new material about the crash of his T-28 in the northeastern Congo. Holm was badly burned, and a local witch doctor applied a tribal salve that kept him alive until a Belgian helicopter rescued him. The first chopper crashed, but the second one got him out. The Air Force sent a Boeing 707 to bring him the rest of the way home.

Holm's CIA career began in 1960 with a visit to the Agency recruiting office in Washington, DC. He had just completed his service with the Army Counterintelligence Corps in France. The offer of a promised-to-be-upwardly mobile position in the file room was politely but firmly declined. He pressed for something more exhilarating, using his fluency in French, overseas experience, and college degree as leverage. Given the option to wait and join the clandestine service when openings became available, he accepted. After completing the operations course in late 1961, he volunteered for paramilitary training, realiz-

[9] Richard L. Holm, *The American Agent: My Life in the CIA* (London: St. Ermin's Press, 2003).

ing that meant an assignment in Southeast Asia. He served two years in Laos and Thailand and describes the challenges of recruiting and running local tribesmen to collect intelligence while adapting to a changing political environment at home.

Holm liked working in the field and after returning to Washington was pleased to learn he would be sent to the turbulent Congo in 1964. His description of the Agency's mission there and operational hurdles he encountered are a vivid account of what young officers can expect when working in newly created nations. It was this assignment that was cut short by the plane crash.

The Craft We Chose tells how, after more than two years of extensive reconstructive surgeries and rehabilitation, and with the help and encouragement of his colleagues, including CIA Director Richard Helms, Holm decided to return to the Agency and continue his career.

By May 1967, Holm was working in the Far East Division, studying Chinese, learning to play tennis again, and starting a family. Then came a tour in Malaysia and two in China. His descriptions of these assignments show what it is like to recruit and handle agents while dealing with routine station operations. Holm returned to Headquarters in 1981 for a career-broadening assignment on the Congressional Affairs Staff. But it didn't last long. In January 1982, he was selected by the director of operations to take over what was then called the "Terrorist Group," a 17-person unit that was the only element in the Agency tracking global terrorism. After quickly changing the name to the "Counter Terrorist Group" (CTG), (404) Holm spent the next two years expanding the team to meet operational demands. William Buckley—who would later be kidnapped and killed in Lebanon—and William Daugherty, one of the three CIA officers the Iranians had taken hostage in 1979, soon joined the group. Analysts from other Agency elements were also added. After two years on the job, Holm had quadrupled the size of the CTG. He then left for Brussels.

Holm served undercover most of his career, but while in Brussels, he was named in the press by Bob Woodward. William Casey had asked Holm to brief Woodward, off the record, when he was still chief of the CTG, but Woodward failed to honor the conditions of the meeting. Among other complications this event created was the need to explain to his children what he really did, a situation confronted by most clandestine service officers at some point.

After Brussels, Holm returned to Headquarters to head the Career Management Staff of the Directorate of Operations. His discussion of this position, which he held for two years, gives readers a good view of how the careers of operations officers are managed.

Holm's last overseas assignment was in Paris. He writes of developing a relationship with Ambassador Pamela Harriman and of the problems created when one of his officers was exposed to the French during an operation. The incident led to a series of controversial investigations and unwanted press exposure.

At the end of his Paris assignment, Holm returned to Headquarters, where he received the Agency's highest award, the Distinguished Intelligence Medal, and then retired. In the final chapter, Holm reflects on his long career and the changes that have occurred since he first signed on. Of the many lessons he learned, he stresses that "We sometimes need to deal with individuals who aren't much better than those we are battling.… We simply can't infiltrate the worst of the worst using only instruments that are pure as the driven snow." (544)

The Craft We Chose is a unique contribution to the literature of intelligence, demonstrating what can be done when one has talent, is motivated, and refuses to be overcome by adversity.

The Interrogator: An Education, by Glenn Carle. (New York: Nation Books, 2011), 321 pp., index.

Glenn Carle joined the CIA after graduating from Harvard. After a number of overseas tours, he was working at Headquarters when he was assigned to interrogate a high-value detainee captured shortly after 9/11. Carle had no formal training as an interrogator, but he was fluent in the language of the detainee and was experienced in dealing with agents overseas. In *The Interrogator*, Carle explains how the assignment changed his life and that of the detainee identified by the pseudonym CAPTUS.

Like many memoirs, this one lacks source notes.[10] That is not necessarily a problem since authors seek to express a viewpoint on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, as most media commentators do every day. It is often the case, however, that unsourced memoirs are associated with controversy, and *The Interrogator* falls in this category. Part of the controversy stems from what Carle judges to be unwarranted redactions, blacked-out words, phrases, and paragraphs deemed by publication reviewers to endanger sources and methods. (291)

The more important controversial aspect, however, is Carle's reaction to an implicit order to employ, or at least not interfere with others employing so-called enhanced interrogation techniques to get CAPTUS to talk. Carle argues that his superiors had concluded CAPTUS knew a great deal about al Qaeda plans and says they applied pressure on him to learn just what the detainee knew by using enhanced interrogation techniques if necessary. The situation is complicated by two factors. First, Carle disagrees with the use of the techniques because, he says, they don't work; he asserts that more conventional, low-key approaches do. Moreover, Carle cites CIA documents that he claims state that it is not CIA policy to employ such techniques if they amount to torture. Second, Carle writes that extended interrogations of CAPTUS led him to conclude the detainee was not the source others thought him to be and thus couldn't provide the intelligence they anticipated. When Carle refused to go along with the use of harsh techniques, he was withdrawn from the case and sent home. Carle notes, by way of vindication, "that CAPTUS had been, at last, released," an action not afforded to high-value targets.

While *The Interrogator* concentrates on the CAPTUS case, readers also learn how operations officers deal with strains on family life and the consequences of career-changing decisions. In his afterword, Carle reiterates his views on enhanced interrogation and argues that the Agency should adhere to the policies expressed in the interrogations manuals because they are effective and because following them is the right thing to do.

Intelligence Abroad

The Art of Betrayal: Life and Death in the British Secret Service, by Gordon Corera. (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2011), 472 pp., endnotes, photos, index.

"It's such dirty business that it's only suitable for gentlemen," said an unnamed old-school member of Britain's Secret Intelligence Service (MI6). The KGB agreed and successfully recruited a number of young British gentlemen. *The Art of Betrayal* begins after WW II—when "MI6 was a gentlemen's club and gentlemen could always be trusted."(71) It was a time when young gentlemen were in positions of power, the service didn't officially exist, a woman's place was

[10] For examples, see William Colby, *Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1978); Duane R. Clarridge, *A Spy For All Seasons: My Life in the CIA* (New York: Scribner, 1997); and Philip Agee, *Inside The Company: CIA Diary* (New York: Bantam, 1978).

in the secretarial pool, and the chief was known only as "C." By the time the book ends, recruiters openly visit universities, the chief gives public talks in true name, women have headed stations, and adversaries steal secrets by using the internet or oppose the government through acts of terror. (71)

Gordon Corera, security correspondent for the BBC, covers some familiar ground but with a slight change in emphasis—"at the heart of this book lie the personal accounts of men and women" who have served in "different ways in different countries."(2) His story begins in the early 1950s in Vienna, where a would-be defector is sent back across the curtain to perform an assignment in order to earn his freedom; he is never seen again. Those were dangerous days for agents, when intelligence about the Soviets was scarce and "the Whitehall mandarins frequently expressed their frustration at the poverty of information" as they struggled to foresee Stalin's next move.

Corera goes on to tell how MI6 gradually improved its capabilities, how it learned to cooperate with the Americans and their Office of Policy Coordination (a component eventually absorbed into the CIA's Directorate for Plans), how 23 year old Daphne Park (later a baroness) defied custom and became an important case officer, and how Kim Philby managed to wreak havoc until his dismissal in 1951. The story continues with operations in Africa after the colonies gained independence. Then Corera shows how the Penkovsky case became a turning point for MI6 as it began to develop its modern espionage expertise under Harold Shergold, while the molehunt brought on by KGB defector Anatoliy Golitsyn complicated the service's attempts to deal with Soviet penetrations in the Admiralty, the government, and MI6 itself.

The Philby case surfaces again when Corera examines its impact on MI6 and the KGB. "In the end I suspect Philby made a mockery of everyone, particularly ourselves," wrote his former controller, Yuri Modin. (247) Things improved in the late 1970s with recruitment of Oleg Gordievsky, and Corera looks at that case in detail. With the end of the Cold War, MI6 began to focus on new threats, while mindful that the KGB was still active under a new name. There was a new degree of openness, as the UK ambassador discovered when his Russian driver gave an interview admitting he spied on the British for the KGB. It was also the time, Corera writes, when Vasili Mitrokhin escaped to Britain with copies of KGB files that put a full stop to many old cases and some new ones. Overseas, MI6 began to operate once again in Afghanistan, a country that had bested Britain in two wars in the 19th century. Corera reveals that MI6 was authorized to help the CIA find Osama bin Laden, with the stipulation that he be well treated if captured. In the end, "not enough intelligence came through to make it worthwhile." (313) But the most significant events for MI6 were the decisions to become legally avowed in 1994 and to build a new headquarters. There was "a little sorrow" by some old-timers, Chief Sir Colin McColl said of the former, and some ridicule about the headquarters, an unusual building dubbed "Lego house."

After a discussion of the intelligence controversy surrounding Britain's role in the run-up to the Iraq War, *Art of Betrayal* ends with some reflections on the changes that have occurred since WW II and observes that "the world of Daphne Park…Philby, Penkovsky and Shergold is still there if you look hard enough." (401) A fine overview, well told and well documented.

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